Secularization and Cultural Criticism

RELIGION, NATION, & MODERNITY

Vincent P. Pecora

The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London

1 * Secular Criticism and Secularization

Ideologically speaking, nothing characterizes the Westernness of modern Western thought more profoundly than the acceptance by its elites of what became a fairly naturalized idea of ongoing secularization rooted in the Enlightenment. Any talk of secularism or secularization in the academy is bound to take us back to the Enlightenment, to what is commonly called the scientific revolution of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, and to the fitful but seemingly inescapable disenchantment of the world it inaugurated (for rather different approaches to the coherence of the term scientific revolution, see Cohen; Shapin). For the European and American intellectual, secularization is the essential developmental narrative inculcated by university training, the sine qua non enabling that training's truth claims. The usual story goes something like this: Increasingly skeptical and mechanistic forms of knowledge take root (Descartes and Hobbes), with humanism as their foundation and astronomy as their leading edge (Galileo). This "Great Instauration," as Francis Bacon called it, overturned the old physics of Aristotle and put knowledge on a new and firmer footing. One could claim that the entire epistemological reform boiled down to one simple transformation: the reduction of Aristotle's fourfold conception of causality (in *Physics* 2.3), which had once encoded the entelechy of nature, to one kind only—blind efficient, or mechanical, causality (see Aristotle 194b17–195b30).

The new knowledge was still in certain ways indebted to old paradigms. For example, Bacon still hoped to improve human understanding by returning it to some "perfect and original condition" in which the empirical and the

rational are once again lawfully married (see Abrams 60). Nevertheless, as the general story of Enlightenment has it, the scientific revolution in turn engendered technological modernization, possessive individualism, a capitalist ethic toward labor and production, social differentiation, and administrative rationalization—all of which added up to a shift from a static, traditional, but also non-Western society to a dynamic, modern, Western one. In this sense, the process of secularization is akin to the structural and evolutionary distinction between prehistoric and proto-historic (post-Neolithic) civilization that Claude Lévi-Strauss once encapsulated in terms of societies being either "cold" (small, homogeneous, resistant to change) or "hot" (drawing upon the energy and desire for change supplied by caste and class division)—though Lévi-Strauss's Marxism led him to believe that the "utopian" society would be a Hegelian synthesis of "cold" and "hot" processes raised to the level of culture (Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* 28–30).

What the educated mind sharpens its tools against and then supposedly leaves behind as Enlightenment descends upon it is "religion," however the historical dawn of modern science is understood in its particulars. Recent accounts in this vein have placed Spinoza's early critique of divinely inspired scripture at the heart of a "radical Enlightenment," one in which secularization and egalitarian liberation were closely related (see Israel). Thus, the core of the secularization idea, which takes various forms, is the claim that overt belief and participation in religion are abandoned as Enlightenment science, technological modernization, and the fragmentation of social life into separate and autonomous spheres of endeavor are embraced. Karl Löwith, among others, further noted that it was the West's belated recognition in the eighteenth century of the antiquity, richness, and humanity of the non-Christian civilizations of China, India, and Persia that led figures such as Voltaire to reject the revealed, sacred history of the Christian West—though, it must be admitted, at the price of a certain anti-Semitism (see Löwith 106–7). Today, by contrast, we seem increasingly compelled to acknowledge that traditional religion has not really disappeared in anything like the wholesale way this version of the secularization thesis predicts. For many, the Enlightenment's triumph of reason over nature has become a historically impoverished narrative unless it is seen in relation to the religious heritage with and against which it was dialectically defined. Moreover, there is renewed interest in one account of secularization, which claims that the emotional and psychological energies formerly exercised in religious activity simply migrated elsewhere. Whether we follow Emile Durkheim or Carl Schmitt or Löwith, we could point to nationalism and socialism as the great twentieth-century sublimations of what was once called religion.

Skepticism toward the old grand narrative of progressive enlightenment has been a staple of what is often called postmodernism. Michel Foucault has come to be most closely associated with the antihistoricist, antihumanist questioning of Enlightenment reason, though his skepticism had many precursors. We generally point first to the genealogy practiced by Nietzsche and to the antihumanist philosophy of the late Heidegger (see Heidegger on language, especially *Poetry* 189–210). But one might also invoke the radical rejection of the Enlightenment articulated early on by clearly very different religious thinkers such as Joseph de Maistre and Kierkegaard. When some, perhaps expanding on Isaiah Berlin's perspective, call the story of twentieth-century social thought from Freud to Foucault "the Counter-Enlightenment," they conflate the various and, to many in the humanities, quite different responses to the Enlightenment found in all these figures: Maistre is not Heidegger, and neither of them is Foucault, but they all at times are seen as trying to subvert an easy confidence in the European Enlightenment (see Berlin 1–24). I will stick with Foucault's account for a moment, because what it leaves out has come to be, I think, important once again.

Foucault's Enlightenment

The Enlightenment was for Foucault a product not of "disenchanted" reasoning and observation, but of a sudden shift in the grammar of our thinking, in the mode of representation. Foucault refused to accept the Enlightenment's grand narrative about clearer thinking, distinct ideas, and better evidence replacing superstition and myth and insisted instead on arbitrary transformations in the "regularities" by which knowledge was constituted. He also claimed, in *Madness and Civilization* especially, that the Enlightenment was able to consolidate itself not by defining reason against religious belief, but by defining reason against a new and differently codified other—madness—which reason had to invent, as it were, in order to distinguish itself in the first place (see Foucault, *Histoire*). Foucault's argument on this point was both brilliant and influential, but it had some unfortunate consequences. It helped many Western intellectuals forget, and at a most untimely global moment, several older and perhaps still viable theses: (a) that religion was the primary rival of the new science in the Enlightenment; (b) that, at the same time, the transformation of religious belief and practice was as much an engine of the Enlightenment as its effect, as Max Weber in his *Protestant Ethic* had implied; and perhaps most of all, (c) that religion did not suddenly disappear as a result of the Enlightenment, but continued, in both spirit and practice, to be a shaping force in the creation of the modern world (see Cassirer 134–96).

My point is that, until fairly recently, Foucault's work helped us to dismantle the received and uncritical story of Enlightenment *progress,* which Benjamin once satirized as homogeneous, bourgeois history, but only by obscuring the question of *secularization* (see Benjamin 260–61). Obscured, too, was the way Enlightenment rationality made an enduring separate peace with religion, largely through deism, pantheism, Hegelian history, and the private *moralität* of the disavowed religious conscience—all the compromises (Israel refers to them as the "moderate Enlightenment") that Nietzsche, and to an extent Hume before him, energetically and for the most part ineffectually denounced. We need to recall this dialectical dance of reason and religion in the West, not because we might otherwise be less than vigilant in defending reason against the onslaughts of new religious fervor, but rather because the simpler narrative it complicates is the most deeply rooted and enduring element of what we might call the Western ideology: the belief, as Grace Davie puts it, "that whatever characterized Europe's religious life today would characterize everyone else's tomorrow" (Davie 1). In effect, as students of Foucault, we learned how to rethink the Enlightenment's idea of progress, but not necessarily the story of secularization that accompanied it.

But in other quarters, and especially in the history and sociology of religion, the secularization thesis has received increasing attention in recent decades, and some historians have recently advanced the often unacknowledged role of religious thought in the development of Enlightenment rationality more generally (for good examples, see D. Bell; Jacob). The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed various forms of religious revival, many connected to new forms of postcolonial nationalism, while the end of the cold war turned discussion away from the capitalism-communism polarity toward what we might call the globalism-sectarianism polarity (and what has been called "glocalization"). There is nothing accidental in the fact that what appears from one perspective to be the great age of economic globalization seems from another perspective to be the great age of religious sectarianism. The problem of secularization is thus being confronted anew, this time in what Edward Said would have called contrapuntal terms, with one eye on Europe and America, and the other on the formerly colonized worlds of the Middle East, India, Africa, and Asia. The questions being asked are not necessarily new, and many were asked by Max Weber in his various examinations of religious history, however differently we may answer them today (see, for example, Weber's concluding chapter, "The General Character of Asiatic Religion," in his *Religion of India* 329–43). What, precisely, does secularism entail? Why has secularization taken radically different forms outside a few Western European nations? And most basically: Can we speak of modernization *without* secularization?

Recently such questions have acquired a new urgency, especially in the midst of a so-called war on terrorism. To confront the process of secularization that Foucault neglected, to address the significance of secularization within the idea of progress, means to recast the terms of the discussion.

It may not be possible to provide definitive answers to such questions, and in any case it is not my purpose—and it is certainly beyond my abilities—to provide a new global and historical overview of what secularization has meant. Moreover, I want to argue neither that the West has tragically never been as secular and scientific as is often claimed, nor that the West's commitment to secular reason has, via some destructive dialectic of enlightenment, led it inexorably toward inhuman horrors. Both revisionist views can be, and have been, cogently argued, a point I will take up in chapter 3. Instead, I want to emphasize here that the dialectical narrative of Western enlightenment and religion should not hastily be put aside when those in the West begin to talk about its relationship to non-Western parts of the world. The depth and persistence of the secularization story, its capacity to inflect even the most critically self-aware corners of Western thinking, is the surest sign that recurrent debates surrounding cultural relativism are both inescapable and irresolvable. For such debates are in many ways functions of Western secularization. The historical narrative of the advent of secular rationality in the West is almost never told as if it were reversible, as if the West would one day return, for example, to a medieval religious cosmology. (Yeats and Spengler toyed with such reversibility in the form of cyclical return, and we find it in Vico's proto-romanticism and in Nietzsche, but the notion was in fact one of the first victims of the Enlightenment and has practically no place in university curricula today.) As a result, the question of cultural relativism cannot help but turn endlessly on itself once the narrative of secularization acquires a certain credibility and consensus.

The relativistic historical perspective that allows "us" to see our own approach as embedded in and dependent upon cultural determinants, and thus no more "natural" than the determinants of other cultures, depends in turn upon a certain latitudinarianism, if I may borrow a term from Western religious history. That is, such relativism depends on tolerance that grows out of or fosters a harmonizing rather than an antagonistic stance—as in Lévi-Strauss's utopian synthesis of hot and cold societies—and hence a more universal view of the whole range of possible sectarian differences, as we would find in Diderot's deism. In this way, our ability to be comfortable with relativism oddly depends on, or slides inexorably toward, a thin but broad and pluralistic universalism. But this universalism, this sense that through a less judgmental and more dispassionate gaze one has grasped the most truly

general characteristics of human being, human civilization, even "human rights," as the Abbé Sieyès and others obviously thought they had with ideas like the "the rights of man," can be explained away—indeed, I think it often *is* explained away these days—as a fiction embedded in a specific kind of Judeo-Christian humanist culture, that is, the kind that believes in the secularizing narrative that entails a latitudinarian tolerance based on individual rights rather than communal duties, on a putatively dispassionate separation of private from public beliefs, and on a sentimental or "natural" identification with others. (For an account of and response to this sort of critique of the legitimacy of "human rights," see Habermas, *Postnational* 113–29.) Hence, it is just as true to say that universalism depends upon, or slides inexorably back toward, relativism—and so on and so forth. Still, secularization is most often understood, and by definition, as a one-way street, quite despite a very widespread disavowal of the cultural evolutionism that characterized nineteenth-century anthropology. (We might consider Durkheim here, for example, for whom a muted form of the secularization narrative persisted in the historical development he outlined that took us from mechanical to organic solidarity, despite his rejection of evolutionism. It is precisely Durkheim's equivocal evolutionism that persists within Lévi-Strauss's structuralism.) Even in the anomalous United States, where religious observance, as sociologists have long noted, seems to accommodate itself quite well to social modernization, underlying assumptions about the inevitability of secularization remain powerful among the cultural, judicial, and scholarly elite. Once civilization embarks upon it, there would seem to be no turning back.

What this means is that, for the secular Western intellectual, a vital public life driven by religious sentiments, as is the case in America today—by religion that is not simply a private affair of the heart—remains the clearest sign that, as Habermas once concluded, modernity is an "unfinished project" (see Passerin d'Entrèves and Benhabib). Such a phrase is designed to indicate the incomplete historical fulfillment of our rational capabilities. When the public political face of religion does appear, as it does both throughout the Middle East today and, via more muted Protestant forms, in America too, it is generally attributed, especially by a liberal cultural elite, to a defect, as it is by Marx, or at least an unfortunate detour in the normal course of human development. When more essential distinctions about the central role of religion in creating a unified sense of "a whole civilization which grew under the aegis of that religion" are invoked in the West (Lewis, *Islam* 4), the author may seem willing to embrace a model of global politics that finds little room for constructive compromise, let alone unifying consensus (as seen in Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis, itself derived

from Lewis's work). Moreover, the only sort of religiousness that is widely acceptable for most of the Western intelligentsia is the intensely private sort of belief associated with the nonevangelical sects of Protestantism. And yet, as numerous anthropologists, sociologists, and cultural pundits have noted in recent years, it is precisely the idea of a public life infused with religious sentiment that can be found in many parts of the globe today, and not only in the underdeveloped world (see, for example, Almond, Appleby, and Sivan). Despite the commitment to secular truth among many intellectuals, America, as the recent Pew Forum polls have shown, remains both profoundly homogeneous when Christianity at large, rather than race or ethnicity, is considered, and very much at ease with the audible and visible presence of Christian sentiment in public life.

In this context, I want to point briefly to several exemplary, and decidedly different, positions on the larger question of secularization. These views have a special relevance, I think, in a world the religious complexity of which has been newly impressed upon a secular academy since the end of the cold war and the dissolution of its opposed stabilizing blocs of political hegemony. The collapse of this bipolar geopolitical world helped to usher in a variety of global religious revivals, especially Islamist, Hindu nationalist, and Christian fundamentalist, and to open a new wave in the religious politics of terrorism and counterterrorism.

Said, Asad, and Discrepant Experience

The first position can be represented by Edward Said, who in countless ways throughout his career championed two basic Enlightenment ideas: that truth is a material production of human, rather than divine, history, and that all political life should be based on the autonomy and dignity of the individual human will. It is thus perhaps obvious that this most important heir to Foucault's dismantling of the Enlightenment's hubris about universal progress was paradoxically yet deeply committed to the secularization that Diderot's Enlightenment required. That is, Said routinely challenged the West's presumption to have achieved a level of moral and political superiority insofar as it remained blind to an oppressive imperialism rationalized as the spread of reason and Christianity. And yet, the problem of the process and meaning of secularization per se—as opposed to the achieved position of a secular criticism that has risen above the religious motives of those it discusses—rarely arises in Said's work. In its broadest and most idealized sense, Said's notion of secular criticism is designed to challenge dogmatism of every stripe. It is aimed not simply at religion, but at all modes of thought

that simulate the certainty and unquestioned authority of religious dogma: racism, nationalism, imperialism, indeed any form of system-building—here Swift is his unlikely ally—that seems divorced from personal experience (see Said, *World* 1–30, 72–89). But religious belief remains the template of all such systems, and it is the historical impulse toward secularization that remains the engine of Said's antidogmatism. (For a good appraisal and critique of Said's own rather dogmatic distinction between the religious and the secular, see Gunn 73.)

In a sensitive and subtle comparison of the Orientalism of Renan and Massignon, for example, Said provides portraits of thinkers who emerge as substantially moved by religious sentiments (Said, *World* 268–89). At the same time, he castigates those who would see "Walter Benjamin not as a Marxist but as a crypto-mystic" as examples of a "curious veering toward the religious" that he aligns with a most regressive and "uncritical religiosity," which "expresses an ultimate preference for the secure protection of systems of belief (however peculiar these may be) and not for critical activity or consciousness." The idea that careful critical analysis of religious motivations might be useful in the case of Massignon but not in Benjamin is defended, it seems, because Benjamin was a Left-utopian, like Ernst Bloch, "whose work was an attempt to metamorphize the social enthusiasm of millenarianism into everyday life" (292). Unlike Said's discussion of Massignon, the commentary of those who attempt to investigate religious traditions and motives in Benjamin's work today do so only "as the result of exhaustion, consolation, disappointment" (291).

Said's judgment, in my view, is rather reductive on this point. Were Frank Kermode's *Genesis of Secrecy* and Northrop Frye's *Great Code*, both of which Said invokes as examples of a "curious veering toward the religious," really signs of exhaustion and disappointment? In Frye's case, after all, the "veering" had surely been going on for decades by the time *The Great Code* appeared. Is the "social enthusiasm of millenarianism" embraced by some on the Left somehow beyond critical evaluation, as if it were above rational suspicion? More important, there is for me as well the questionable assumption that matters of religion are not worth investigating in Bloch and Benjamin, precisely because in these latter figures such matters are somehow all made subservient to "everyday life." But this simply begs the question, assuming what an account of secularization would need to address: that "everyday life" in modernity really has nothing to do with religious thinking, even though in Said's view all sorts of other irrational ideological formations, such as racism, play powerful roles in mundane affairs. For me, the subtle disconnection between religious modes of thought and modern "everyday life" is one of the

significant characteristics of Said's work. It is all the more significant if we consider that Said was not averse to treating Orientalist prejudice as itself akin to "religious discourse," in that "each serves as an agent of closure, shutting off human investigation, criticism, and effort in deference to the authority of the more-than-human, the supernatural, the other-worldly" (290).

After all, secularization is at the very heart of what Said means by modern Orientalism.

> My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism. (Said, *Orientalism* 122)

Here, Said is in fact the heir not of Foucault and his idea of arbitrary historical rupture, but of Meyer Abrams's *Natural Supernaturalism*. On the one hand, the secularizing process was a moral and political liberation, embodied in a wide range of comparative historical projects from Vico to Herder, and given aesthetic form in the transcultural sympathies of Mozart's *Magic Flute* and Goethe's *West-Ostlicher Diwan* (see Said, *Orientalism* 118; Said's introduction to Auerbach xv). In this sense, secularization meant that "notions of human association and of human possibility acquired a very wide general—as opposed to parochial—legitimacy" (Said, *Orientalism* 120). At the same time, the secularization of religious tradition is precisely what enabled the more precise, controlling, and scientific disciplines, including "lexicography, grammar, translation, [and] cultural decoding" (121), which made modern Orientalism—quite unlike the religiously based "precolonial awareness of Dante and D'Herbelot"—"fatally tend towards the systematic accumulation of human beings and territories" (123). Buried within the process of secularization for Said there is a paradox, akin though not identical to what Adorno and Horkheimer had called a "dialectic of enlightenment." On the one hand, secularization enabled the increasing possibility of sympathy with the other through the transcendence of religious parochialism, precisely as the deism of the Enlightenment would suggest, and Said himself is, like Auerbach in this respect, very much an intellectual product of that transformation. On the other, secularization enabled the systematic ability to accumulate both knowledge of and power over the Orient, and it is this corrupting transformation that impedes the fulfillment of the more sympathy-inducing and humane fruits of secularization. In this sense, secularization was simultaneously necessary for achieving broadened human sympathies, and the non-West's worst enemy.

Said's methodological antidote to this paradox of Western secularization is the imperative to read culture contrapuntally, and it is perhaps fair to say that no other gesture has had as profound an effect on the academic practice of cultural criticism in the last half century. At its heart, as Said acknowledges in *Culture and Imperialism*, this is an expansion and decentering of the ruling ideas behind Western comparative literature, which were themselves originally broader applications of the ideas behind comparative philology and Goethe's notion of *Weltliteratur*. Said's idea is to juxtapose what he calls "discrepant experiences"—that is, experiences that may be quite different in terms of history, geography, cultural and religious contexts, and political power, but that nevertheless coexist, interact with, and shape each other because of the framework of Western empire. To read "contrapuntally," then, is to read "with a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts" (Said, *Culture* 51). In this way, we learn both that cultural identities are not "essentializations," since Greeks require barbarians, Europeans require Africans and Orientals, and so forth, in an ongoing process of dialectical oppositions, but also that part of the appeal of cultural identities is that "they seem and are considered to be essentializations" (52). There are many things one might say about Said's notion of contrapuntal interpretation, but I will restrict myself to a few of the most salient issues.

I want to emphasize the degree to which such a perspective is, as Said notes, primarily an outgrowth of a long European tradition of comparative scholarship that, at least from the time of Herder and William Jones, has insisted upon the study of the diversity of Western and non-Western cultures as central to the educated mind. It was Said's signal achievement to have pushed this scholarship toward an ethical recognition of its role in the domination of colonized peoples and cultures, and toward an epistemological revaluation of its assumptions about the status and superiority of the West. That the colonized world had been changed by imperial practices, no one doubted; but Said's work also encouraged Western scholarship on Western culture to acknowledge to what extent imperialism had created the culture of the West as well (Said, *Culture* 35). Said's perspective is, as he recognizes by pairing it with what he calls "secular interpretation," at heart a latter-day version of perhaps the central achievement of the Enlightenment where "discrepant" cultural experience is concerned—secularization. What I am saying, in perhaps too hurried a fashion, is that Said's sense of the ethical and epistemological virtue of "contrapuntal" reading is the product of a notion of rational tolerance, underwritten by early eighteenth-century English natural religion and the deism of the Encyclopedists, which is itself a consequence of

the process of secularization that began as early as the late medieval Catholic humanists and the Protestant Reformation.

As Diderot quite succinctly observed in the vivid terms of "De la suffisance de la religion naturelle," which provides a ground of sorts for both Lévi-Strauss's utopianism and Said's secular contrapuntalism, natural religion "is that which reconciles civilized man and barbarian, Christian, infidel, and heathen, philosopher and people, the learned and the ignorant, the old man and the child, even the wise and the insane"; revealed religion, on the other hand, "estranges father from son, arms man against man, and exposes the learned and wise to the hatred and persecution of the ignorant and fanatic, and from time to time soaks the earth with the blood of all of them" (Diderot 1:63). This is not to say, as Said points out numerous times, that curiosity about the other is somehow a peculiar product of the Western mind (a claim Bernard Lewis once made; see Said, *World* 37). Nor, obviously, is it to imagine that non-Western societies, as Lewis has also implied at times (see the introduction), have failed to generate or accommodate what the Western scholar would call secular thought, in the form either of atheism or of something that might translate the idea of "humanism" (see, for example, Asad, *Formations*, on the "translation" [207] of Western notions of secularism by Egyptian thinkers in the nineteenth century; Sanson on *laïcité islamique* in modern Algeria). But it is to suggest that the belief that the seeming incommensurability of different and apparently unequal cultural traditions can be overcome by a more cosmopolitan and wholly secular understanding of their interrelations begins, at least in Said's work, with those strains of Enlightenment thought that sought to overcome religious sectarianism by weakening the power of revealed religion and diverting its energies into other forms of culture such as art.

That Europe had more success in this regard with the competing confessions of Christianity internal to it than with the competition between Christianity and Islam—or, I would hasten to add, between Christianity and Judaism—is an enduring part of the history of the West. And yet in *Culture and Imperialism*, Said allows little space for the discussion of religion per se and refers to Christianity and Islam primarily as the geopolitical divisions of a world that empire has made. But this also means that the modern, post-Enlightenment idea of "culture" remains for him rather Arnoldian in its parameters. It is largely the culture of *already* cosmopolitan and worldly modern writers and artists, primarily European but also of formerly colonized regions, for whom specific religious heritages remain primarily as survivals. When the question of strong, fundamentalist religious belief in modern non-Western societies does arise, it is seen primarily as the consequence of Western

domination and interference, of "a deep-seated anti-Westernism that is a persistent theme of Egyptian, Arab, Islamic, and Third World history," which too often tends to "return to its Meccan roots the better to combat the West" (Said, *Culture* 34). This is a compelling view, but it also raises interesting questions. Are we then to assume that secularization in the modern world is the transcultural norm, one that would flourish indigenously everywhere if given a chance, while religious belief, especially strong religious belief that wants political acknowledgement, is an aberration caused by imperial domination? Or is secularization, in the West and elsewhere, in fact a rather complicated and protracted historical process, as a return to religious roots in many parts of the world would suggest? Indeed, because of the close historical alignment of Christian tradition and the modernization processes that led to social rationalization and nation-state bureaucracies, modern Western imperialism itself would seem to promote simultaneously, and paradoxically, retrenchment in indigenous traditions as cultural defense, conversion to a new faith, and a potentially deracinating secularization.

Gauri Viswanathan's discussions of religious conversion in contrapuntal terms are designed to address this sort of problem. One of the consequences of the introduction of Evangelical missionaries into India, against which British Orientalists had unsuccessfully argued, was the use of education to wean Indians away from dogmatic Hindu belief and toward Christianity. But this process—based, as Macaulay's *Minute* had recommended, on the teaching of English literature—was inseparable in the event from the production of a new and secular civil society on a British model, in which there was "a relocation of cultural value from belief and dogma to language, experience and history" (Viswanathan, *Masks* 117; see also van der Veer and Lehmann 28). In Viswanathan's subsequent account, though missionaries may have regarded the conversion of Hindus to Christianity as also entailing a conversion of native subjectivities to "English concepts of 'nation,' 'community,' 'rights' and 'equality,'" the actual effect could be "associated with a deconstructive activity central to modernity itself" (Viswanathan, *Outside* 76). That is, because of the ambivalence of British colonial law, which treated religion, in secular fashion, more as an administrative category of civil society than as a publicly meaningful system of belief, and was hence willing to consider Hindu converts to Christianity as "legally" Hindu whenever it seemed appropriate (at times to the convert's material benefit), Christian conversion in Viswanathan's view was less about dissolving an individual's native religious affiliations and creating an allegiance to the community of the governing class than it was "designed to induce . . . a permanent dislocation and exile from a sense of community at large" (88).

In reading the imperial history of religious conversion contrapuntally, Viswanathan instead wants to insist upon a deeper and more authentic significance to the act of religious conversion, not as an effect of mere ideology, but as part of a lived tradition that can be a form of liberating dissent to the deracinating and often intolerant (when linked with nationalism) effects of Western secularization. It is a resistance to the arbitrary authority of the civil state she also finds, albeit in equivocal terms, in John Henry Newman's conversion to the dissenting position of Roman Catholicism in Victorian England. At the least, this puts an interesting new wrinkle in Said's idea of contrapuntal reading as the critical path to a secular and enlightened transcendence of religion and absolutism alike. In its broadest sense, however, and despite Viswanathan's attempt to put some distance between herself and more thoroughgoing critics of the Western-style secular state such as Ashis Nandy, this view ultimately wants to treat religious "belief as a form of knowledge" (Viswanathan, *Outside* 253; see also Nandy, "Politics"), that is, as effective, public truth—precisely what secularism undermines—while rejecting the more absolutist forms that would punish heresy and, as in the case of Salman Rushdie, blasphemy. As Nandy has put it, secularism is viable primarily for the "culturally dispossessed and the politically rootless," and it often paradoxically creates a fundamentalist ideological reaction; for those not thus deracinated, a different path is more compelling: "the opposite of religious and ethnic intolerance is not secularism but religious and ethnic tolerance. Secularism is merely one way of ensuring that tolerance" (Nandy, *Romance* 77).

In broader terms, Nandy has argued that the secular modernity of the West, with its ideology of progress, hardens distinctions between self and other, and between different religious faiths, precisely because the state's need to "manage the public realm" entails not only the separation and relatively autonomous functioning of the different spheres of civil society—the economic, legal, cultural, religious, and so forth—but also the debilitation of religion, which "is an open or potential threat to any modern polity" (Nandy, "Politics" 74). By contrast, he claims, "traditional" Indian "ways of life" did not separate religion from politics, or self from other, and have, "over the centuries, developed internal principles of tolerance and these principles must have a play in contemporary politics" (84). Nandy's perspective is trenchant, as far as it goes. But what it neglects is the degree to which premodern, largely dynastic polities were "political" in a very different sense than are modern ones. It is precisely the need to accommodate a large, more or less equally enfranchised, individuated, and no longer passive citizenry, with their powerful desires and institutions, that over time makes the traditional and more casual accommodation between religion and politics problematic in modernity.

In effect, if political modernity seems to entail secularization, it may be because so much more is at stake for the modern citizen, whose political role is far more active and self-determining, and who as a result sees the political state as an important facilitator of or hindrance to individual and collective happiness. Nandy argues against "India's Westernized intellectuals" and their more rigorous demand for a secular public sphere by calling for a kind of pluralism that derives from Victorian England, where, he claims, secular*ism* first emerged as a doctrine with George Holyoake and religion still overtly permeated political life (Nandy, "Politics" 74). But Victorian England's dominant political regime, which could hardly be called multiconfessional in reality, fostered political pluralism only by virtue of its secularizing tendencies—we need only imagine the nature of Disraeli's political career had he not been as fully assimilated and in fact baptized into Christian society—and the same would likely be true of Nandy's version of a religiously infused but tolerant Indian state, based as it is on Gandhi's understanding of traditional Hinduism. It thus remains unclear how Nandy's preferred idea of a culturally rich and nonsecular religious tolerance, with a dynamic interfaith dialogue, can exist in modern, democratic, self-fashioning societies without some measure of state and administrative secularization.

In its own way, Viswanathan's contrapuntal reading of secular and religious cultures winds up doing something similar: it persuasively emphasizes the role of religions, of various sorts and in fluid relationships to one another, in creating viable public culture and politics, but it implicitly falls back on the notion of a secular pluralistic civil society to undermine all absolutist claims and to guarantee the possibility of critical dissent from the religious hegemony of the majority. "The pressing problem," she not unexpectedly writes, "is how modern secularism can accommodate and absorb the reality of religion and the power of religious conviction experienced by believers, while at the same time protect the rights of those who believe differently" (Viswanathan, *Outside* 173). But what does it finally mean for secularism to "absorb the reality of religion"? On the one hand, this formula seems perfectly congruent with American-style religious pluralism, especially as promoted by George W. Bush, as opposed to the more rigorous republican secularism of the French state. But it also invites an even greater and potentially riskier public role for religious values and meaning in civic life than current American sensibilities, already quite religious, might be willing to allow. On the other hand, it is precisely the secular and pluralistic idea of civil society, even in America, and especially in the law, that finds the reality and public role of religious *knowledge* difficult to accommodate, and that moreover is so often seen by religious sociology as a function of the particular path of secularization itself in the West.

The sense of permanent dislocation or deracination that such secularization may produce has of course often been decried (as Alasdair MacIntyre has done in his work) or celebrated (as Nietzsche has done) as consequences of the Christian tradition, even *within* that tradition. Yet if a political structure—a civil society—that protects "those who believe differently" is really to be sustained in a rigorous way in modernity, then some turn toward privately held religious beliefs, and away from religion as the shared public and political "knowledge" that both Nandy and Viswanathan want us to recognize, may be the inevitable result.

Contrapuntal reading, at least as I understand Said's use of the term, is thus not a method particularly well suited to the fruitful synthesis of secular humanist traditions and still-powerful religious ones. This is precisely where it will hesitate, for the moral vision behind the impulse to contrapuntal thought and secular criticism depends on *some* version of pluralism, on the ultimately compatible nature of a wide array of moral, religious, and cultural affiliations, a pluralism underwritten in the West by the often unsatisfying moral mix of toleration and individual rights preached by secular humanism. It is a mix that for Said made possible a dismantling of Western imperialism's chauvinism by holding it up to the measure of its own Enlightenment promise, though it is just this mix that Stanley Fish has quite trenchantly criticized as underwriting "liberal complacency" (see Fish 45).

It may not be true that *only* the Christian tradition, as both Bernard Lewis on the Right and Jürgen Habermas on the Left have suggested, can produce the secular perspective that allows this sort of tolerance, worldliness, and, as John Rawls puts it, noncomprehensive or "overlapping" political consensus, in which the idea of justice "remains independent of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines" (see Rawls 144). (Rawls's "overlapping consensus" indeed bears a certain vague resemblance to Wittgenstein's claim that "rational" and "religious" discourses should not be considered simply "incommensurable"—the one cognitive, the other not—but rather that such different ways of referring still have "overlapping" similarities; see Putnam 73; Wittgenstein 53–72.) But it surely is true that the process of secularization that takes us from Luther to Diderot is a crucial feature of the modern history of the West, and that Said's ideal of secular criticism is one of its signal manifestations. In this sense, a notion such as secular criticism cannot be employed in any depth without at the same time invoking a parallel set of problems about the process of secularization that produced it, a process that is itself asymmetrical—and not only as a result of imperialism, as we move from one culture to the next—and that is still in many cases at the very heart of what we mean when we talk about "discrepant" cultural experiences. In the

end, secular criticism at some level entails talking about the specific processes of secularization that have both enabled it and mark its limitations.

Interestingly, Said may have confronted the problem of Western secularization itself most directly in one of the last things he wrote—his introduction to the fiftieth-anniversary edition of Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis*. To be sure, Said's underlying perspective returns us to the heroic individualism that appears throughout his work. "Thus it all unmistakably comes down to a personal effort," he writes of Auerbach. It is a judgment that refers most immediately to Auerbach's powers of sympathetic cultural synthesis, based on experience rather than interpretive systems; but it just as surely refers back to Auerbach's heroic ability, as a German Jew writing in Islamic Istanbul, to identify imaginatively with the history of Christian European culture. And yet, Said is more explicit here than in earlier work about the degree to which the long and tortuous process of secularization is a (perhaps *the*) central issue for Western culture, one that profoundly shapes Auerbach's subject matter and methods alike. Thus, Auerbach's sympathetic and nonsystematic humanism is itself the final product of the long development of such humanism in the West, one that begins in what Auerbach discerns as the mixture of styles and the imaginative sympathy for the lower social orders in the Gospel of St. Mark (something not found in Petronius or Tacitus), which is in turn rooted in the doctrine of Christ's human incarnation in the humblest of circumstances.

But the full measure of what humanist secularization came to mean for Auerbach—and for Said too, I think—emerges with Dante. "Auerbach's choice of Dante for advancing the radically humanistic thesis carefully works though the great poet's Catholic ontology as a phase transcended by the Christian epic's realism, which is shown to be 'ontogenetic,' that is, 'we are given to see, in the realm of timeless being, the history of man's inner life and unfolding'" (Auerbach xxvi; quotation of Auerbach 202). Dante draws technically from the forceful presentation of the human figure in pre-Christian classical literature. Yet it is precisely the secularization of Christian doctrine as human history in Dante that propels Auerbach's narrative, right up to his account of the kinship between his own methods and the culturally fragmented, yet also more deeply human, techniques of literary modernists such as Proust, Joyce, and Woolf. It would not be too much to say, I think, that Said's account of Auerbach's work elaborates it as the effect of the cultural secularization Auerbach himself did so much to describe, and that this account is implicitly also a description of Said's intimate and agonistic relationship to his own secularized Christian culture.

I want to contrast Said's influential perspective very briefly with an opposed position more sympathetic to the continuing significance of religion,

though one equally critical of Western imperialism, found in the work of Talal Asad. An anthropologist, Asad is interested primarily in how the secular and the religious codetermine one another. For him, the secularization thesis, and by implication Said's idea of "secular criticism," are unsustainable, primarily because the body of representations fostered by religion can never in practice be confined to the delimited space accorded them by modern nation-state constitutions, with their clear separation of church and state. "If the secularization thesis no longer carries the conviction it once did, this is because the categories of 'politics' and 'religion' turn out to implicate each other more profoundly than we thought, a discovery that has accompanied our growing understanding of the power of the modern nation-state" (Asad, *Formations* 200). This does not mean that Asad wants to portray modern secular political structures simply as reformulations of religious ones, as had Karl Löwith and Carl Schmitt, but rather that he wants to see multiple traditions of religious beliefs and secular responses in constant relation to one another. "The secular, I argue, is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred). I take the secular to be a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life" (25).

The disruption of any straightforward narrative of secularization also means that religion is inevitably forced into a militantly political role in an effort to maintain itself against the monopolization of power by the secular state. "Islamism's preoccupation with state power," Asad writes, in terms that to some extent recall the critique of Nandy, "is the result not of its commitment to nationalist ideas but of the modern nation-state's enforced claim to constitute legitimate social identities and arenas. No movement that aspires to more than mere belief or inconsequential talk in public can remain indifferent to state power in a secular world" (200). In Asad's larger terms, the consequence of the tolerance toward competing religious traditions displayed by Western civil society is the reduction of religion to "mere belief" and "inconsequential talk." It is similar to what Viswanathan, who follows Asad's lead in many ways, means when she writes that "in a disestablished society where 'truth' is no longer a function of belief but of what is amenable to codification, proof, and administration, the potential of private judgment to act upon a world enveloped and defined by public doctrine is minimized, even marginalized" (Viswanathan, *Outside* 47). For Asad, Islam is properly political, though not a function or champion of nationalism, when it finds itself increasingly contested by the controlling political structures of a secular state apparatus in which only "mere belief" can be tolerated. Like Christian

fundamentalism in America, Islam must assume a public, political role if it is to be taken seriously in a civil society defined and regulated by a secular state.

If we accept Asad's reasoning completely, the idea of the universal character of human rights, so central to a secular humanist like Said and, not incidentally, for many others one of the great achievements of post-Holocaust political thought, is defined as no more than a projection of secularized Christian nation-states (for Said on human rights, see Said, *Reflections* 411–30; see also Mailloux 1592–93). That is, particular religious beliefs have supplied substantive norms that are then elaborated, self-interestedly, as "universal." It is most clearly in this sense that modern "secularism" for Asad must be considered an ideology, no less than the religious belief it contests. But this point of view also raises interesting dilemmas. Asad notes that Western intellectuals decry female genital mutilation in Africa (practiced both within and outside Islamic areas) as a violation of human rights, though no one says anything about what Asad calls "the custom of male genital mutilation"—that is, circumcision—in the Judeo-Christian West (Asad, *Formations* 148–49). The outrage in the West over female genital mutilation rests for him primarily on a culturally specific belief, which he traces to Christianity's views about bodily integrity and suffering, that individuals have a right to sexual pleasure as part of their human-rights inheritance, as Martha Nussbaum has argued, invoking Rawls's notion of "overlapping consensus" (see Nussbaum 78). For Asad, the perspective expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is in fact a secular emanation of Christian culture, and the idea of some cosmopolitan transcendence of specificity is a too-convenient political fiction.

On the one hand, it is easy to sympathize with Asad's view of the shortcomings of the Christian West's application of "human rights"—a view substantially shared by Said. Asad is surely correct to note, for example, that the Muslim Malcolm X's secular framing of racial oppression in the United States as a human-rights violation, one worthy of international intervention, met only with scorn among America's political elite, while Martin Luther King's framing of the issue in terms of prophetic Christian belief could be recognized in an American context of civil rights and eventually gained widespread support. He is also right to call our attention to the need for an "anthropology of secularism," by which he means a critique of the enabling myths, the disavowed violence, and the redemptive, universalizing attitude toward the rest of the world underwriting the idea of secular liberalism. But in the end Asad must implicitly accept some of the most unyielding and reductive accounts of the difference between a secularized West and a religious non-West, despite his claim to keep these boundaries fluid.

In his earlier *Genealogies of Religion*, Asad seems loosely to accept the validity of Lévi-Strauss's opposition between "cold" and "hot" cultures as a way of comparing religiously traditional societies in many parts of the Islamic world, in which change is supposedly never desired, to more secular Western societies that in his view find themselves coercively harnessed to the endless and compulsive pursuit of growth and transformation. Such societies are divergent and opposed; they embody the idea of "discrepant experience" to a perhaps unbridgeable degree. But this means that Asad begins to approach, albeit in a relativistic fashion, the perspective of figures like Huntington and Lewis in the West, and Nandy in India, for whom there really are large-scale, essential differences of civilization separating the Christian West from the nations composing the Islamic world, differences mainly of religious heritage that seem to allow neither overlapping consensus nor, perhaps, codevelopment. Such differences cannot be evaluated from, or superseded by, the supposedly neutral Archimedean position of secular humanism. Whatever one may think of Asad's particular claims—I find his reasoning about female "circumcision" to be simplistic in the extreme, for example—it is clear that comparing religious traditions as forms of strong belief desiring political recognition, rather than mere tolerance, to the secularized ethical and political cultures dominant in Western nation-states does not yield easily to what Said means by "contrapuntal" thought.

Between Asad's civilizational and often polarizing approach to what secularization represents and Said's tendency to characterize this process as something increasingly less significant for the study of global culture from the eighteenth century onward, cultural criticism has so far found little room to maneuver. The most important imperative today may be a perspective that remains discomfited both by Said's heroic secularism and by Asad's equivocating relativism, which tends at times to refuse the philosophical and political possibilities of secular consensus altogether. This would mean embracing secular criticism's potential autonomy and sympathy, wielded by humanists such as Said who were shaped by the West's Enlightenment ideals, while acknowledging Asad's claims about the continuing and globally asymmetric historical interpenetration of religious and secular thought. (In *Provincializing Europe*, Dipesh Chakrabarty attempts to accomplish such a synthesis, albeit with mixed results that I shall address in my conclusion; see Chakrabarty.) The secular can perhaps be thought of simultaneously as a strategically occupied critical standpoint and as the result of uneven cultural developments that are in fact far from—and perhaps can never be—complete, even in highly developed Western nations.

Marcel Gauchet points up what is at stake for cultural criticism if it takes seriously the problem of secularization as a continuing theoretical issue.

> The diametrically opposed standpoints of aloofness and passion, involvement and uninvolvement, hostility and partisanship conspire to deny the historical role of the religious. . . . It is not enough to dispute the validity of the apologists' reconstruction dictated by faith, which tries to salvage the transhistorical perpetuity of *homo religiosus*, by relativizing its historical connections. We must also free ourselves from the atheist's illusion that religion may tell us something about the underlying psychology of the human race or about the workings of the savage mind, but tells us very little about the nature of the social bond and the real driving force behind history. The picture created by this groundless assumption is no less distorted than the first. It may even more effectively conceal what a society structured by religion is, and what religion itself is. (Gauchet 5–6)

I believe that in an increasingly globalized world no religion anywhere can remain permanently untouched by the corrosive yet also liberating forces of secularization that we associate with the term Enlightenment. At the same time, I think religion continues to be too basic and ubiquitous a phenomenon to be relegated to a pre-Enlightenment world, or to the unfortunate effects of political domination, and in this sense widely different varieties and degrees of secularization may be the expected effects of an increasingly global economy and culture.

Habermas's Dilemma

One of the central problems of Western secularization arises in the tension between what we might call the epistemological imperative of secular criticism and the recognition of the morally generative force of religious belief itself. This tension can be neatly illustrated by turning to a few passages from the work of Jürgen Habermas. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and, with it, the cold war, the influential German social philosopher published an essay reflecting upon the future of European integration. The argument of the essay distinguishes between (a) the universalistic potential of political culture, embodied in civil rights and democratic self-determination, in short, the whole range of republican notions of citizenship associated with the French Revolution, and (b) what Habermas calls the "ethical-cultural form of life as a whole," which can be roughly translated by the terser idiom of American social thought as "ethnicity." Habermas's point is that ethnicity cannot be allowed to restrict the universal ideals behind the republican notion of citizenship.

The tension Habermas outlines between the cultural solidarity provided by ethnicity and the political rights of citizens would have been, in 1992, familiar enough to Americans prepared by two decades of debate about multiculturalism, as would his pluralist conclusion that "only within the constitutional framework of a democratic legal system can different ways of life coexist equally. These must, however, overlap within a common political culture, which again implies an impulse to open these ways of life to others" (Habermas, "Citizenship" 17). To Europeans, however, and especially to West Germans suddenly facing both the difficulties caused by a large and mostly Islamic-Turkish guest-worker population and by the burdens imposed by reunification with their impoverished and suspicious East German compatriots, Habermas's critique of cultural chauvinism and his support for liberal immigration policies had significant implications. Moreover, as best demonstrated by the French president Jacques Chirac's calls for legislation banning the wearing of religious symbols in French state schools, including large crosses, yarmulkes, and headscarves on Islamic women, what would pass for pluralism in the European context might yet be a long way from religious pluralism in America.

Habermas's version of pluralism—that is, his belief that a single political culture of republican democracy can accommodate within it "different ways of life," with different "ethical-cultural" foundations—is not detailed enough for us to tell whether it is closer to the French or the American understanding of the term. But it draws directly, if implicitly, on the later work of John Rawls, in that what Habermas hopes for is what Rawls calls an "overlapping consensus" between different ethical-cultural perspectives, each of which would contain what Rawls calls "comprehensive" moral doctrines, and the purely political culture that takes shape formally in the space of the *civitas* alone. Though Habermas surely intends that religion be understood as one of the elements contained in the phrase "ethical-cultural life as a whole," the specific issue of "religion" does not appear at all in his essay. More important, Habermas's account of the historical evolution of the nation-state is distinctly secular in this 1992 essay, as indeed would be most convenient in an explanation of the nation-state's transcultural, or purely political, function at the present time.

> In the sixteenth century, kingdoms gave birth to those territorial states—such as England, France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden—which were later on, in the course of democratization in line with the French example, gradually transformed into *nation states*. This state formation secured the overall conditions under which capitalism was then able to develop worldwide. The nation state provided both the infrastructure for rational administration and the legal frame for free individual and collective action.

Moreover, and it is this which shall interest us here, the nation-state laid the foundations for cultural and ethnic homogeneity on the basis of which it then proved possible to push ahead with the democratization of government since the late eighteenth century, although this was achieved at the cost of excluding ethnic minorities. The nation state and democracy are twins born out of the French Revolution. From a cultural point of view, both have been growing in the shadow of *nationalism*. (Habermas, "Citizenship" 2)

The logic of the passage is subtle and dialectical, but significant: it is the new nation-state, born of old kingdoms and empires, and consolidated by the French Revolution, that both allows at first for the production of a certain ethnic homogeneity via discrimination against minorities, and that in turn subsequently allows for the progress of democratization and cultural pluralism that Habermas argues will be central to the new Europe. That is, the nation-state may have been an instrument of cultural (including, presumably, religious) solidarity and exclusivity, but the link between the two is arbitrary, and in any case would be dismantled by the progress of democracy.

Habermas's secular account of the evolution of democratic governance in the nation-state is congruent with how he has responded elsewhere to ambiguities in Weber's approach to "rational authority," where political domination preserves itself not only by coercion and by appeal to the material, emotional, or ideal interests of the dominated, but also by cultivating belief in the *legitimacy* of its authority. Habermas approaches the question of legitimacy by referring to the evolution of a universal moral consciousness, based on the presupposition

> that the values and norms in accordance with which motives are formed have an immanent relation to truth [*Wahrheitsbezug*]. Viewed ontogenetically, this means that motivational development, in Piaget's sense, is tied to a cognitively relevant development of moral consciousness, the stages of which can be reconstructed logically, that is, by concepts of a systematically ordered sequence of norm systems and behavioral controls. To the highest stage of moral consciousness there corresponds a universal morality, which can be traced back to fundamental norms of rational speech. (Habermas, *Legitimation* 95)

While Habermas is here more interested in the systematic than the empirical superiority of this developmental presupposition, it is as a whole nevertheless the cornerstone of his long opposition to Niklas Luhmann's "systems theory" approach to the legitimacy of social authority.

Luhmann has argued that once law in modern societies is "positivized"—which is to say, once law is respected as legitimate based purely on the procedural legality of its making, "because it is made by responsible decision in accordance with definite rules"—then "arbitrariness becomes an institution" as far as the legitimacy of authority is concerned (quoted in Habermas, *Legitimation* 98; see Luhmann, "Soziologie" 167). Oddly, like Carl Schmitt, though without Schmitt's fear of pure legalism and emphasis on sovereignty as extralegal exception, Luhmann reduces the question of norms and law to that of a decision legitimated by nothing more than other decisions: "The positivization of law means that legitimate legal validity [*Rechtsgeltung*] can be obtained for any given contents, and that this is accomplished through a decision which confers validity upon the law and which can take the validity from it. Positive law is valid by virtue of decisions" (quoted in Habermas, *Legitimation* 98; see also Luhmann, "Positives" 180). While formal rules may reflect a necessarily latent set of norms that stabilize expectations, no further justification can be found for validating those norms beyond the fact of belief in them. In effect, such norms must remain implicit: explicit criticism of them would only be destructive in the end, as is the belief that one *could* subject them to criticism if needed, because all validity claims for deeper norms are "functionally necessary deceptions [*Täuschungen*]. The deception may not, however, be exposed if the belief in legality is not to be shaken" (Habermas, *Legitimation* 99).

One might say that it has been Habermas's lifelong project to refute this line of reasoning, this decisionist theory of social solidarity, norms, and legitimacy that for Schmitt had formed the basis of modern political theology. Habermas's longer answer is that although system integration takes on a life and direction (or entelechy) of its own in highly administered, bureaucratic capitalist states, social integration nevertheless requires the elaboration of a neo-Kantian notion of communicative ethics, in which deeper norms can in fact be validated as true by reference to certain essential components and limits of rational speech, and to the sort of explicit, consensus-driven, and openly criticized norms embodied in bourgeois constitutions (see Habermas, "Citizenship" 8). What is important is that this sort of answer is based on the presumption of a developmental model of universal moral consciousness, even as it rejects as untenable either the return to a tradition of natural law or right (as proposed in the work of the influential conservative philosopher Leo Strauss) or to the pure value-rationality of religious belief. Habermas's secular, pluralistic nation-state, which can presumably accommodate very different "ethical-cultural" ways of life within its borders, would nevertheless seem to be based on a natural, and in the end fairly coherent, evolution of moral consciousness toward universally valid norms.

In a recent interview with Habermas prepared for inclusion in a collection of some of his writings touching on religion, an interview that clearly responds

to the resurgence of broader scholarly interest in religious sectarianism in the decade that has elapsed since his essay on "Citizenship and National Identity" was published, his approach toward the rise of the nation-state is rather different. In this conversation, published in 2002, Habermas gives religion an historical centrality it did not possess earlier.

> In the West, Christianity not only fulfilled the cognitive initial conditions for modern *structures* of consciousness; it also demanded a range of *motivations* that were the great theme of the economic and ethical research of Max Weber. For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a postnational constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk. (Habermas, *Religion* 148–49)

It would not be an exaggeration to say that *this* account of religion's role in the formation of Western political culture, which penetrates to the moral and epistemological roots—the "*structures* of consciousness" and the "substance"—of a Judeo-Christian legacy underlying the rise of republican democratic citizenship and its putatively universal claims to legitimacy, opens up rather new sorts of questions. (Habermas's interview, originally in German, was translated for inclusion in this English-language volume only. Though no German text has been published, his terminology here echoes that in previously translated essays.) If, as Habermas claims, the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love really do constitute the indispensable legacy of any secular political culture that would tolerate and contain religious difference, then we face an interesting problem.

The universal potential of this republican *political* culture now appears to derive and draw sustenance from a distinct and actually quite limited *religious* culture. We are suddenly taken back to the Gordian knot Marx tried to cut in his much-debated essay, "On the Jewish Question," which is largely a response to Bruno Bauer's claim that no Christian state—Prussia was the example in question—would be able to sustain the political emancipation of the Jews. Interestingly, despite the salient examples of the French Revolution and the United States' Bill of Rights, both of which granted Jews equal civil rights with Christians, neither Bauer nor Marx had much faith in religious

or "ethical-cultural" pluralism, as we understand it in America today. Bauer was convinced that only the complete renunciation of religion by a nation's citizens would allow for true equality of rights (the position adopted, though certainly not without contradiction, by current antipluralist French republicanism), while Marx famously argued that religion, being a defective product of defective social conditions, would in fact disappear of its own accord once one abolished the more basic inequalities of private property that were left intact (as, for example, they had been in the United States) by purely political emancipation. The ambiguity in Habermas about the particular religious foundations of a supposedly universal political culture reminds us that neither the French Revolution and the American Bill of Rights nor Bauer and Marx finally solved the dilemmas posed by pluralism. Indeed, I would suggest that Habermas's position, suspended as it is between a secular, or "enlightened," history of Western political life and a recognition of the religious legacy underwriting that history, is exemplary for Western intellectuals today, who find themselves increasingly caught between the universal claims of secular political ideals and the undeniable, perhaps foundational, and in any case ambiguous role of a particular religious heritage behind those claims.

Habermas has long used phrases like "semantic potentials" and "semantic energies" to describe those fragments of utopian idealism left behind by the Judeo-Christian tradition that he feels must not be forgotten in contemporary secular political life (see, for example, his essay "Walter Benjamin: Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique," discussed in chapter 2). As a summary of his views on religion as a "semantic" resource, he is fond of citing a passage that appears in his *Nachmetaphysiches Denken:* "As long as religious language bears with itself inspiring, indeed, unrelinquishable semantic contents which elude (for the moment?) the expressive power of a philosophical language and still await translation into a discourse that gives reasons for its positions, philosophy, even in its postmetaphysical form, will neither be able to replace nor to repress religion" (Habermas, *Nachmetaphysiches* 60). The passage quoted above from his recent interview perhaps gives us a somewhat broader sense of what he means, and it points as well to the underlying importance of Max Weber's religious sociology.

For Weber, the essential question concerned the historical influence of world religions upon "economic mentalities"—"*structures* of consciousness" and economic "motivations," in Habermas's terms—and, more particularly, the degree to which specific religious ethics fostered or hindered the rationalization of economic life typical of capitalism (see Giddens 169). Weber did not claim that there was any simple correspondence between religious and economic ethics, acknowledging that capitalism was indeed compatible with

a range of religious beliefs. He saw history as the complex result of ideological and material resources, and was no more willing to subscribe to a religious determinism than to an economic or Marxian one. The important context for understanding Weber's thinking is history: the question for him is not simply "what is the logical link between religion and economics or politics?" as if one could produce or be sustained by the other, but always, "what, in the event, was the logic of the historical link?" This latter is a question entailing the nonteleological idea that things might always have been otherwise. Indeed, Weber's thesis about Protestantism's role in the rise of capitalism rests squarely on the idea that Protestant reformers, from Luther and Calvin to Zinzendorf and Wesley, were inspired by religious—not ethical—ideals, so that "the cultural consequences of the Reformation [including the ethical, economic, and social alterations that are Weber's main object of study] were to a great extent, perhaps in the particular aspects with which we are dealing predominantly, unforeseen and even unwished for results of the labours of the reformers" (Weber, *Protestant* 48). It is also important to recognize that, at least in the hands of later theorists of secularization such as Berger, Weber's work itself often wound up being more unambiguously accepting of capitalist modernity than his more cynical (or tragic) view of an increasingly bureaucratized Europe would imply. Nevertheless, there are points in the Weberian perspective that for our purposes remain especially problematic .

Given his remarkable later analyses of world religions, for example, Weber's work still implies that there was something specific about the rationalization achieved and stimulated at the time of the Protestant Reformation—and hence by means of an evolving Christian tradition—that made it especially suited to the forms of economic and political development pursued by Europe. Moreover, he appeared to claim—with the rhetorical finesse of the opening line of the author's preface to his *Protestant Ethic*—that such rationalization was universal in its significance: "A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value" (Weber xxviii). The conditional nature of this sentence is somewhat belied by the assurance with which Weber makes a case for this sentiment in the rest of the preface, but the parenthetical "(as we like to think)" signals that, even for Weber, all such claims in the end remained shaped by the underlying demands of political self-interest. Hence, pinning down specifically what sorts of cultural particulars might possess "*universal* significance" has always been controversial.

The recent attention to religion from a global and comparative perspective has intensified the controversy, since it is precisely the supposedly quite different capacity of other religious traditions, such as Islam, to rationalize and secularize that is often at issue when a "clash of civilizations" is invoked; this has been true for figures such as Lewis and Huntington, as well as Nandy and to some extent Asad. Because for Weber the historical event of religious rationalization, driven by prophetic reforms within Christianity, contributed to the creation of a fully fledged capitalist psychology, however irrational it may have become, and hence enabled the administrative modernity of the Western nation-state, secularization and modernization appeared to be inextricably linked, yielding what has now become a much-disputed "secularization thesis." Although the secularization thesis has taken somewhat different forms in the Anglo-American and European literature, its yoking together of modernization and secularization (and along with them, nationalism), as if one necessarily implied the other, has once again become an issue, if only because secularization and modernization on a global scale may also imply Westernization, even if the process, as it is playing out in India, Indonesia, Egypt or Turkey, seems to be occurring in very different ways. That is, the vaguely Weberian notion that modernity depends upon increasingly rationalized religious belief is for many less compelling at the beginning of the twenty-first century, when such a process is now routinely associated with the global cultural domination of an American and European consciousness, than it was at the dawn of the twentieth.

The contemporary resurgence of interest in the global interaction of religion, economics, and politics forces us to confront these issues anew. In an insightful essay, for example, Austin Harrington surveys this ground from another angle, that of Ernst Troeltsch's concept of Europe, and demonstrates just how far Weber, Troeltsch, earlier figures such as Georg Jellinek, and later followers such as Hans Joas try to emphasize the "contexts of religious value formation" in the creation of modern secular notions of human rights—contexts that go beyond Kantian formalism—without reducing such notions to their religious roots. Harrington's sense that such writers claim "universal validity on behalf of western political principles while at the same time acknowledging the historical specificity of these principles" captures perfectly for me the dilemma of the Western intellectual in the era of an increasingly global world order (Harrington 492).

The difficulties of the Weberian view of religion and secularization leave us with basic problems in understanding the significance of what Habermas calls the legacy of Judaic and Christian ethics for modern secular culture. When Habermas refers to the idea that modernity's "cognitive initial conditions" are

to be located in Christianity, and when he traces the "substance" of universal equality, individual conscience and moral autonomy, democracy, and human rights to Judaic and Christian traditions specifically, we have a right to wonder whether he is in fact implying that this ethical "substance" is actually rooted in a natural and essential human condition—that is, in human nature, however broadly conceived, and in ideas of natural law and right regulating that nature. In this construction of Habermas's meaning, which is at least plausible given his embrace of the secular, the Judaic and Christian legacies are significant not because of some "revelation," either scriptural or theosophic, of truth and justice that was vouchsafed to them alone, and which Habermas has explicitly refused, but because they happened to have elaborated historically contingent, yet coherent and compelling, versions of some more innate or natural human truth, which has in some sense enabled secular modernization (as Weber's account has it), but which would be theoretically available to all ethico-religious traditions under the right circumstances.

But to put things in this fashion suggests that Habermas's statements on the unique significance of the Judeo-Christian legacy depend somewhat cryptically on notions of natural right and law that have themselves depended in his work on nothing more than the power of a putatively contingent and deliberative ethics of communication. Habermas elsewhere has distinguished between "classical [or Aristotelian] Natural Law," where "the norms of moral and just action are equally oriented in their content toward the good—and that means the virtuous—life of the citizens," and "the formal law of the modern age," which "is divested of the catalogues of duties in the material order of life, whether of a city or of a social class. Instead, it allows a neutral space of personal choice, in which every citizen, as a private person can egoistically follow goals of maximizing his own needs" (Habermas, *Theory* 84). Hence modern invocations of natural law (seen in both the American and French Revolutions), which eventually require its reduction to positive statutes, "cannot be legitimately preceded by anything but the autonomy of isolated and equal individuals and their insight into the rational interdependence of Natural Law norms" (*Theory* 85). It may be, then, that Habermas's references to the "structures of consciousness" endowed by a Judeo-Christian tradition are necessary supplements to, or replacements for, the decidedly compromised status of classical natural law theory in his work.

For example, it is clear from other remarks Habermas makes in his interview that quite specific elements of the Christian legacy represent for him "an entirely new perspective," one that is central to his sense of a democratic modernity: the idea of an Incarnate God who is both "Creator and Redeemer," through which a "finite spirit acquired a standpoint that utterly

transcends the this-worldly" (*Religion* 148); the dialogism of Aquinas (152); and the Judeo-Christian roots of the "capacity for decentering one's own perspectives, self-reflection, and a self-critical distancing from one's own traditions" (154). Moreover, Habermas notes that his doctoral dissertation focused on the Gnostic/Kabbalist idea of God's capacity for self-limitation and withdrawal, or *tsimtsum* (in Jacob Böhme and Isaac Luria, in Schwabian Pietism, and in Schelling and von Baader), and that the Judeo-Christian myth of the fall is what for him opens up the space for the "*intersubjective constitution* of autonomy and the meaning of the *self-binding* of the will's arbitrary freedom to *unconditionally* valid norms" (160–61)—in short, the space that structures his larger ethics of communicative action.

The contradiction Habermas's interviewer, Eduardo Mendieta, finds on this point is from my perspective fairly significant: "in one tendency, religion is liquefied and sublated in discourse ethics and the theory of communicative rationality; in the other, religion is given the function of preserving and even nurturing a particular type of 'semantic' content that remains indispensable for ethics and morality, but also for philosophy in general" (162). Habermas denies the discrepancy by insisting, as he has in previous writings, on a vaguely Hegelian model in which secular philosophy has simply not yet been able to translate all the politically significant religious and presumably still Judeo-Christian concepts into a viable public and universal discourse. But does this process really have the shape of a univocal unfolding (or "translation") that Habermas implies? And if it is merely a "translation," does this mean that the end result is still dependent upon religious "structures of thought"? The question mark included in his recognition that religion possesses "unrelinquishable semantic contents which elude (for the moment?) the expressive power of a philosophical language" would suggest a confidence perhaps less certain than Hegel's.

I want to suggest that Habermas's lack of clarity about the precise meaning and function of the Western religious tradition in his social philosophy is representative of numerous dilemmas facing Western intellectuals generally today. What, ultimately, *is* the ethical basis for universal notions of "human rights," which are now routinely invoked by international courts but, as Asad notes, unequally applied? If they are specifically Judeo-Christian as Asad asserts, and Habermas in his interview at least implies, what should be their function in a global culture? If they belong to an older classical model of the moral substance and virtues, do they then vitiate the liberal idea of a Kantian modernity built on nothing but consensus? To what extent do *bien-pensant* global initiatives rooted in Western political thought and its Judeo-Christian heritage, and dominated by Western power even via the United

Nations and nongovernmental organizations, inevitably promulgate both Enlightenment ideals of knowledge and selfhood and Judeo-Christian ethical-political traditions while weakening indigenous ones, as Nandy and Asad might argue? What collective political and military roles should powerful Western governments assume to enforce "human rights" (rather than civil ones) on their immediate borders in places such as Kosovo and Srebrenica? Does some responsibility for violent and not just humanitarian intervention remain the same, increase, or diminish in formerly colonized regions of decidedly different religious-ethical traditions, such as Rwanda, and how would one distinguish a restraint of neocolonial prerogatives from simple racial disregard? If internally generated political struggles generate a crisis of genocidal proportions—for example, in the Sudan, but one could cite many other places—is the military intervention of the nominally Christian Western powers a "humanitarian" duty or a sign of imperial hubris?

Moreover, should not Western nations, to be consistent, put their *own* courts and their adventures abroad under the jurisdiction of international tribunals, in effect recognizing that globally enforced human rights supersede the civil rights granted by particular nation-states as well as their legal and military sovereignty? If the ideas of Europe and, more consequentially, of the European Union are really as "semantically" dependent on the Judaic and Christian legacies as Habermas suggests, is it not at least plausible to oppose the expansion of the European Union to include developed Islamic nations such as Turkey, no matter how modernized (as has Giscard D'Estaing, author of a proposed EU constitution, and others in the French government), or even to oppose the accommodation of large Islamic populations and their distinct traditions in the "Christian" nations of Europe? Is the very idea of the European Union destined to come apart—as a recent referendum of French citizens would imply—in the face of such uncertainties?

Writing from the position that modernity in Europe represents the complete collapse of the rational tradition in morality he traces back to Aristotle, Alasdair MacIntyre has claimed that we have in fact no grounds on which to support the notion of universal human rights at all. For MacIntyre, this collapse begins with Luther's Reformation and with Hobbes (MacIntyre 164). What remains for modernity is only an endless dispute over "too many disparate and rival moral concepts," and "the moral resources of the culture allow us no way of settling the issue between them rationally." Hence, the great liberal ideal, from Kant to Rawls, of a moral and political world built out of consensus is a fiction: "It follows that our society cannot hope to achieve moral consensus" (252). To be rational, morality must be embedded in a living moral tradition that both structures and enables the debates over

rival goods, and such traditions could only be maintained by a return to an Aristotelian sense of virtue (223). All this is lacking in the modern notion of universal human rights, now even more commonly evoked, he notes, than the eighteenth-century ideas of natural rights, which were largely no more than negative assertions of freedom from interference: "In the United Nations declaration on human rights of 1949 what has since become the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for *any* assertion whatsoever is followed with great rigor" (69). In short, "natural or human rights then are fictions—just as is utility—but fictions with highly specific properties" (70). The only rational morality would be one that abjured the modern notion of "rights" altogether and returned to morality narrativized by tradition and supported by Aristotelian virtue.

Habermas has always been skeptical of such views: he is far too committed to the liberal, Kantian dream of a *sensus communis*—that is, of right as the product of self-legislation and the good as the possibility of a discursively built social consensus (however "overlapping," in the Rawlsian sense) underwritten by humanly constructed state constitutions—and far too concerned about the dogmatism that would result were MacIntyre's wish for a return to Aristotelian virtue, defined by substantive notions of excellence or *aretē*, human nature, "the good life," and so forth, actually fulfilled. This is not to say that Rawls and Habermas necessarily agree; indeed, each thinks the other is more metaphysical, or morally "comprehensive," than he ought to be (see Rawls 372–434). It is also not to deny that versions of what Habermas calls "classical Natural Law," of the type at least vaguely congruent with Aristotelian virtue rather than autonomous choice, have survived into the mainstream of modern liberal social philosophy in the work of Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment, in the American founding fathers, and in Matthew Arnold, Emile Durkheim, the Frankfurt School, and more recent figures such as Hans Georg Gadamer and Martha Nussbaum. Like a certain continuing regard for more or less fixed elements of mind in "nativist" accounts of cognition from Kant to Noam Chomsky, modern versions of "natural law," with or without Aristotle's sense of the virtues, have had a long and productive life even after Hobbes—intellectual history is not a punctual, all-or-nothing affair, despite what Foucault may have claimed, and operates on multiple levels (as I show in chapter 2 through Kracauer's work).

But MacIntyre is in general right to emphasize the tremendous weakening of the classical or Aristotelian account in modern social thought, where the sort of consensual and deliberative model that Habermas favors becomes far more central. Adam Smith, for example, includes in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* a discussion titled "Of the character of virtue"; but it is

immediately clear that Smith's "virtues" take root from those bare, mechanical Hobbesian "appetites, of procuring pleasure and avoiding pain" (Smith 248). We need only recall how "sympathy" works for Smith: unlike spontaneous emotion, sympathy is very much the product of highly socialized individuals, which is itself a natural condition, and depends on a spectator's imaginative projection into the situation of the person being observed. Smith's "amiable and respectable virtues" are finally nothing more than the adjustment of the higher passions of the concerned agent with the cooler gaze of a less interested observer (29). In Aristotle, "virtue" was never so negotiable a commodity.

For Habermas, then, dogmatism would be the effect of what in MacIntyre is the only valid ground for coherent moral thought: Aristotle's sense of entelechy in human nature, a final cause or teleological purpose, which had been called by Aquinas "the cause of causes" (Aquinas 172). It is this Aristotelian scheme, whereby "untutored human nature" becomes "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-*telos*" by following historically established moral precepts, a scheme still enshrined in medieval Catholic and even early Protestant theologies, that collapses with secular humanism. The Enlightenment's "scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-*telos*," that is, his entelechy (MacIntyre 54). Modern science had to abandon all such Aristotelian notions in favor of blind mechanical causality, and it was perhaps only to be expected that the modern moral sciences would do so too in favor of purely instrumental, or what MacIntyre calls "managerial," modes of thought. Although many struggled to maintain a sense of human nature, what finally remains once moral discourse is severed from a notion of human *telos* is, as Schiller once put it, no more than the conflict of duties with inclinations (see Schiller 31). Hence, in MacIntyre's version of modernity, "moral judgments are linguistic survivals from the practices of classical theism which have lost the context provided by these practices," a situation that yields only morality as irrational "emotivism" (MacIntyre 60).

But if Habermas, like many other liberal social theorists today, finds any return to an Aristotelian sense of human *telos* and virtue unsustainable in the face of the sheer diversity of desires, goals, and worldviews enabled by modern democratic societies, and (perhaps more important) by the self-fashioning, acquisitive social mobility they often encourage, the vision of moral universals achieved by consensus, such as the idea of human rights, is, as MacIntyre notes, as strong as ever. The question remains, is MacIntyre right to conclude both that consensus is impossible, and that whatever fragmentary notions of morality remain are no more than "linguistic survivals" from a classical theism now dismantled by secularization? Habermas has never abandoned

an implicit sense of historical development—his notion of modernity as an "unfinished project" depends on it—and it is this sense of history in the interview cited above that is inseparable from both the Judeo-Christian tradition and its secularization, and quite different from Aristotle's far more stable, and socially immobile, sense of human purpose. As Auerbach puts it:

> The Old Testament . . . presents universal history: it begins with the beginning of time, with the creation of the world, and will end with the Last Days, the fulfilling of the Covenant, with which the world will come to an end. . . . Thus while, on the one hand, the reality of the Old Testament presents itself as complete truth with a claim to sole authority, on the other hand that very claim forces it to a constant interpretive change in its own content; for millennia it undergoes an incessant and active development with the life of man in Europe. (*Mimesis* 16)

For Auerbach, and I think for Habermas as well, the Greek worldview offered no such vision of world history, one through which the divine came to be understood as incarnated in the humblest of social orders, which were thereby granted a kind of recognition unknown in Aristotelian virtue.

In short, it is this sense of teleology embedded in temporality, such as Hegel's secularization of what Auerbach calls universal history, that is still encoded in Habermas's belief that the Judeo-Christian "legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation" and that "up to this very day there is no alternative to it." But this also means that how we elaborate the character of this "reappropriation and reinterpretation"—which is to say, secularization—is important, and that if MacIntyre is right, there is in fact no coherent meaning to be derived from it at all. In the next section, the tension between two directly opposed positions on the question of secularization may shed some light on what is at stake in Habermas's claim of "no alternative" to the Judeo-Christian legacy. But the debate will also serve to illustrate both that there are no complete answers to MacIntyre's concerns, and no good way of avoiding the task that MacIntyre insists is impossible.

Löwith, Blumenberg, and Impossible Progress

The first account of secularization is that of Karl Löwith in *Meaning in History* (1949). Writing in the period immediately following World War II, with the horrors of the Holocaust and Stalinism fresh in his mind, Löwith mounts a wholesale critique of the Enlightenment's idea of progress both as scientific and moral achievement, which he associates initially with Voltaire and Condorcet, and then with Comte, Hegel, Marx, and others. Löwith's primary

theme is that modern notions of a universal "philosophy of history," following the dissolution of more naive eighteenth-century beliefs in reason and progress, are "entirely dependent on theology of history, in particular on the theological concept of history as a history of fulfillment and salvation" (Löwith 1). In effect, the progress represented in and by the history of Western civilization, which is in the end conceptually encoded by philosophy of history, is no more than a secularized version of Judeo-Christian eschatology. For Löwith, the homelessness of modern thought reveals itself most poignantly as a form of secular theodicy—as a means of justifying the presence of worldly evil and suffering in a scientific age. The Hegelian State and Marxian revolution are but two versions of this secularized eschatology; Christianity was from the start a cult that consecrated a "transcendent faith in future redemption" (30).

But modernity cannot recuperate any such authentic meaning in history without a genuine, which is to say transcendently anchored, theodicy. By contrast, Löwith follows Burckhardt in seeing that modern history, if it is to be truly rational and secular, must refuse both Christian theodicy and its sense of progress toward a utopian harmony. For Löwith, the only truly secular and rational approach to history, divorced from transcendent justification as well as from all expectation of progress toward redemption, would entail a return to classical Stoicism and its acceptance of circular time untouched by moral or political improvement. Instead, he points out, modern intellectuals are often "neither ancient ancients nor ancient Christians, but . . . a more or less inconsistent compound of both traditions" (Löwith 19)—that is, they are both pagan and progressive, and they cannot legitimately be both. For Löwith, only a sober classical Stoicism would dispel the religious ghost haunting secular philosophy of history, a sense of history "as a sheer 'happening' or a *Geschehen* as automatic, autonomous, and inevitable as the happenings in nature" (Riesterer 79). In the face of the profound disappointments that the first half of the twentieth century had brought to the Enlightenment idea of moral progress and social redemption, Löwith concludes that historical reflection can consistently claim to be rational while still articulating some form of continuity only by embracing a classical theory of circular movement, "for only on the basis of a circular, endless movement, without beginning and end, is continuity really demonstrable" (Löwith 207). Otherwise, the modern mind will remain contradictory, hobbled by a sort of split personality that sees "with one eye of faith and one of reason."

Löwith's desire for the radical divorce of a rigorously secular modernity from all traditions of religiously inflected historical progress points toward what Arnold Gehlen once called *post-histoire*, that condition in which the

displacement of the certainty of progress from religious, then to scientific, and finally to aesthetic forms of judgment eventually leads to the dissolution of the idea of progress itself in an ever more futile search for aesthetic novelty. It is a condition that prompted the antiprogressive utopianism of Bloch and Benjamin. But it also leads to what Gianni Vattimo called a postmodern *pensiero debole*, or "weak thought," where one must somehow eschew both the "natural linearity" implied by cumulative knowledge and conceptual refinement and the "Spenglerian nostalgia for 'decline'" (Vattimo 107). Löwith insists that the only consistent historical position is a return to the ancient Stoics' acceptance of meaningless and natural cycles of advancement and decay.

The second account of secularization is that of Hans Blumenberg, whose book *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (1966) was in many ways a response to Löwith's compelling, but rather pessimistic, arguments. (For Blumenberg's genealogy of the idea of progress itself, see Blumenberg, "Lineage." For an earlier account of the Löwith-Blumenberg debate, see Wallace.) Blumenberg's discussion is both large and dense and involves not only treatments of classical and modern thought, but also, in its final pages, a close reading of Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno, who between them frame for Blumenberg the initial breakdown of medieval Christianity's Aristotelian (and Platonic) inheritance as represented by Aquinas and the Schoolmen. Blumenberg emphasizes as a positive transformation precisely the moment in medieval Christianity that a French Catholic Straussian such as Pierre Manent laments: the turn away from the Greek notions of the multileveled concept of soul and world, with its separation of the rational and the passionate, the sublunar and supralunar, and away from the Aristotelian fixity of human substance, relation, and achievement that MacIntyre (with certain reservations about Aristotle's acceptance of slavery) wants to recover; the intensification of God as an utterly transcendent being—in this way looking forward to the God of the deists—and at the same time "the advancement both of man and the cosmos toward the qualities of this transcendence" (Blumenberg, *Legitimacy* 484–85), thus anticipating the modern idea of progress; the holding fast to philosophical nominalism, with its acceptance of the idea that human universals are but conventional signs that may not correspond to real universals in the way Aristotle suggested in his deduction of the four kinds of causality, thus overcoming the philosophical realism of the post-Platonic Greeks; and the emphasis on "the world" as a concept possessing "metaphysical dignity" in itself and worthy of philosophical inquiry.

At heart, all these transformations for Blumenberg derive from the theological problem created by an all-powerful God, who may or may not be

"rational" in our limited understanding of the term—a point the Gnostics had also explored, though in vain—and whose unfathomable power, later embedded in Luther's emphasis on irrational grace and faith rather than works and in Calvin's equally arbitrary idea of predestination, transforms the world into a place of utter contingency. In Max Weber's account of the Reformation's unintended consequences, for example, this emphasis on worldly arbitrariness and contingency in the event paradoxically leads not to increased asceticism and renunciation of the world as a vale of tears (though the monastic solution never actually disappears), but instead to what Blumenberg calls a modest impulse to self-assertion. It is, I think, not unlike what Weber identifies as "the calling," or vocation, in Luther's thought. Modernity is not simply then one "arbitrary commitment" (*Legitimacy* xxix) among others. Contrary to Löwith, Blumenberg insists that theological expectations built into Christian eschatology could only have been understood as a hindrance from the point of view of progress (31); all revolutionary ideas of a "standstill" in time (Benjamin may be the unmentioned reference here) then emerge as the very opposite of progress (86). Blumenberg thus refers to "secularization *by* eschatology," where the failed expectations of an end-time force instead a turn to an increasingly extended sense of human temporality, rather than (as in Löwith) the secularization *of* eschatology (43–45). It is this changed sense of temporality that separates Aristotle from Descartes: understanding nature and history "is accomplished precisely not by the absolutism of the self-guarantee but rather by the idea of method" (33).

Blumenberg's focus on the "epochal threshold" between Nicolas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno—with Copernicus's cosmological revolution in between—is illustrative of the process. While Nicholas of Cusa had emphasized that "man can be a human God and can be God in a human manner" (*Legitimacy* 592), this "Godlikeness" is still predicated on the "hypostatic union," imprinted on each human being, of God's intervention in human history through Christ's Incarnation. For Giordano Bruno, by contrast, such Godlikeness is evident, but it is to be achieved only as an ideal in the progress of humankind (591). The Incarnation thus becomes something of a historical scandal that must be denied: when Bruno, the heretic mounted on his pyre for execution, turns his face away from the upheld crucifix, with its embodied representation of a human-divine duality, he is at the same time acknowledging "a unity of reality in which everything was indeed self-reproducing, self-manifesting God, and man also was a being who becomes God, a unity, however, in which the universality of the transformation that embraces all realities did not admit the singularity of a God who forces His way into human history" (593; see also 115).

With Bruno, the unbridgeable gap between a transcendent divinity and a godlike humanity reopens, this time irrevocably. For Blumenberg, the crossing of this epochal threshold within medieval Catholicism itself marked the rejection of the Aristotelian cosmos and soul that had been embraced by the Schoolmen, and it is this nascent humanism that prepared the way for the modern idea of progress. But quite contrary to Löwith, Blumenberg argues that understanding the idea of secularization and progress in this essentially Weberian way—that is, as a consequence of transformations within the Christian tradition—does *not* mean that it can simply be reduced to a secularized version of Christian eschatology and theodicy.

Blumenberg's basic argument on this score is that modernity's notion of progress, established most directly by the Enlightenment, is indeed in part the consequence of earlier Christian thought, but it is so primarily as a formal "reoccupation" of earlier and now "vacant" theological "answer positions." The appearance in Löwith of some transfer of religious substance in modernity is a function of mere reasoning by analogy. For Blumenberg, heterogeneous modern ideas are overextended in order to respond to already established epistemic needs—including, perhaps, "a human interest that lies deeper than the mere persistence of the epochal carry-over" (*Legitimacy* 69)—so that modern answers take over the *function* of the earlier theological account. Modern thought is thus not simply a secularized repetition of an earlier *content,* in which philosophical or historical understanding would be nothing more than a watered-down version of the substance of no-longer-acknowledged Christian belief, as found in both Löwith and MacIntyre. Hence, although modern answers to ancient questions may retain an important place in our larger reflections on life and history—we ought not imagine any revolution in thought radical enough to abolish the durable significance of a tradition's questions and should thus acknowledge that no "absolute beginning" for the modern dispensation could ever have occurred in any case (48, 74)—the content of the modern answers is essentially different, based on the modern (one might say "protest-ant" as well as "critical") idea of worldly self-assertion rather than the medieval concept of extraworldly salvation.

It is only through an illicit overextension of the idea of self-assertion, for example, that Schmitt can refer—in his critique of Blumenberg—to modernity's false pretense to "self-foundation" (*Legitimacy* 97). Likewise, Marxian dialectical history may be formally a reoccupation of Christian eschatology, and it has certainly been elaborated at different moments as if it could or should respond to transcendent questions, but it actually requires no divine intervention, depends completely on human action and need, and expects results only in this world, not the next. Modern notions of progress thus involve

an immanent—or this-worldly—notion of development that has nothing to do with the "fear and trembling" that characterized the medieval Christian anticipation of the end of time, as Löwith had admitted, and that is reworked by antihistoricists such as Kierkegaard. As John Bury, who in some ways anticipates Blumenberg on this point, argued: "It was not until men felt independent of providence that they could organize a theory of progress" (Bury 22; cited in Löwith 60). Blumenberg thus modifies Hobbes's central idea of self-preservation, which underwrites the dissolution of earlier Scholastic notions of natural law and substance, so that it is less concerned with the brute struggle for survival that governs the passions in Hobbes than with a broader and less egoistically defined orientation toward the future—that is, to predicting and controlling the future in order the better to satisfy a wide array of human interests beyond mere survival (see *Legitimacy* 137ff.).

This orientation toward the future, which is indeed different from anything found in the Greeks but could be described as a formal reoccupation of Christian expectation, thus yields for Blumenberg a sense of historical development, that is, of possible and infinite, though not inevitable or necessary, progress. It arises in the sciences with the overthrow of Aristotelian physics, and even earlier in the arts with the overthrow of Aristotelian ideas of *aretē* and perfection. (Blumenberg's commitment to an idea of infinite but not inevitable progress also bears a certain resemblance to the nineteenth-century neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School—Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Windelband, Alois Riehl, and Heinrich Rickert—which considered the pursuit of knowledge an infinite task. It is this neo-Kantian attitude that Benjamin would ridicule in the Social Democratic Party of his time, as he does in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," considered in chapter 2; see Benjamin, *Selected Writings* 4:408, n. 3.)

One of Blumenberg's significant observations for my purposes is that the modern idea of infinite, though not inevitable, progress may actually provide us with the only valid moral heuristic in the secular world of "possessive individualism" that many, both on the left and the right, have decried as inescapably ruled by nothing more than private interests and historical contingency. Progress is thus neither a necessary component of history, nor part of an eschatological vision—again, it is both infinite and nonteleological—but rather the ambiguous foundation of a modern *moralität*, and hence the key to the persistent, if often abused, significance of the idea for modern societies.

> The danger of this hyperbolizing of the idea of progress is the necessary disappointment of each individual in the context of history, doing work in his particular situation for a future whose enjoyment he cannot inherit. Nevertheless, the idea of infinite progress also has a safeguarding function for the actual individual and for each actual generation in history. If there were an immanent final goal of history, then those who believe they know it and claim to promote its attainment would be legitimized in using all the others who do not know it and cannot promote it as mere means. Infinite progress does make each present relative to its future, but at the same time it renders every absolute claim untenable. This idea of progress corresponds more than anything else to the only regulative principle that can make history humanly bearable, which is that all dealings must be so constituted that through them people do not become mere means. (*Legitimacy* 35)

If we cannot return, as Strauss, Manent, and MacIntyre propose, to the world of substance, natural law, entelechy, and pursuit of unchanging excellence that we often associate with the life-world and circular history of the Greek Stoics—and Habermas is surely right that there is no reason to believe we can—then Blumenberg's neo-Kántian reflections on the historical world that modern society has half made and half inherited might seem to provide the beginnings of a response.

But it is important to admit that Blumenberg's reformulations of the ideas of secularization and progress in fact also raise all sorts of problems, for Blumenberg's ethics remain as purely formal as those of Kant. As Matthew Arnold would have noted, Blumenberg cannot give a substantive content to the idea of progress he articulates—he cannot finally tell us the purpose of this progress—precisely because at this point in history he fears the consequences of invoking any human entelechy or utopian eschatology more than he admires its potential, and perhaps for good reasons. His ability to recognize in Western modernity a formal echo of, or analogy with, Christian themes while denying any similarity of content may thus be a bit too clever for its own good.

For Blumenberg also implies that as secular humanists we can acknowledge the historically Christian character of Western thought while denying its status as revealed or divine truth, but claim at the same time that there was something special about the Christian tradition that allowed it to transform itself—or rather, reverse itself—into a secular universal project that no other religious tradition has, or could have, achieved.

> There are entirely harmless formulations of the secularization theorem, of a type that can hardly be contradicted. One of these plausible turns of phrase is "unthinkable without." The chief thesis then, roughly put, would be that the modern age is unthinkable without Christianity. That is so fundamentally correct that the second part of this book is aimed at demonstrating this fact—with the difference, however, that this thesis gains a definable meaning only through a critique of the foreground appearance—or better: the apparent background presence—of secularization. (*Legitimacy* 30)

Blumenberg's "critique" is based on the idea that only the disappointment of transcendental expectations could have enabled the "natural step" of a projection of possibilities in this world—an aggregate of hopes regulated by methods across generations—as opposed to redemption in the next. There is no identity of meaning, nor a direct historical necessity, in this transition, and yet modernity is still "unthinkable without Christianity." But then in what sense is the thesis "harmless"—which is to say, insignificant? This is the same sort of problem, after all, that haunts Weber, and it is not hard to see how much Blumenberg has influenced Habermas, with the latter's own difficult sense that a still "unfinished" modernity in the West must continue to find "semantic potentials" in the religious tradition that gave birth to it.

In fact, Blumenberg's arguments for the "legitimacy" of modernity cannot respond directly to Löwith's or MacIntyre's underlying complaint that modern thought is confounded by its loss of permanent and transcendent ideas of substantive reason and human nature, because rather than finding natural or materialist substitutes (as some have done by turning to evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, and perhaps even genetics, and as Habermas had in part done by turning to Piaget), Blumenberg treats the permanent loss of these ideals as the only remaining ethical or political compass. That is, Blumenberg does not defend the idea of progress against critics such as Löwith by returning with Hegel to the attenuated substance of reason unfolded by progressive history. Rather, he treats the idea of contingent, endless, and, strictly speaking, purposeless historical progress as the only available ground, however formal and impoverished, of a secular and human-centered, or neo-Kantian, ethical perspective and of all morally justifiable modern social orders. Blumenberg's claim that modern morality effectively depends on a notion of noneschatological and contingent progress suggests that Habermas's sense of modernity as an "unfinished project," one that has not yet been but ought to be realized in full, requires a slightly different inflection. The only modernity that anyone should want, Blumenberg implies, is one that would remain both historically unnecessary and never complete.

Perhaps more important, it is perfectly obvious that Blumenberg's passing acknowledgement of the "disappointment" bred by faith in an endless collective progress that no particular mortal individual will ever fully enjoy is not a sufficient recognition of the immense suffering caused by blind confidence in progress on a global scale. For it fails almost completely to consider the horrors—gladly highlighted by Löwith, MacIntyre, and Nandy, on the one hand, and by the larger field of postcolonial criticism after Said, on the other—inflicted by those nations bent on universal progress (and these have been until recently Western European for the most part) against peoples whose

understanding of civilization and change may have been radically different. As Conrad's Marlow famously noted, European progress seemed to entail "the conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses then ourselves" (Conrad 10). The more recent idea of universal human rights is for some tainted by this problem as well, as Asad points out, since even "progress" in this area has historically generally meant the domination of non-Western and non-Christian peoples by the Christian West. In this sense, progress of the moral no less than the technological sort has often been achieved at a heavy price—a price that led Benjamin to the grandly reductive perspective in which the very idea of progress is itself a barbarism, even *within* the West, though it has generally been the non-Christian peoples, including the Jews, who have paid it. Such considerations make the cultural benefits of modernity appear to be the necessary and unique historical effect of a single religious evolution, at a moment when a new global awareness has made such perspectives more difficult and untenable than ever.

Nevertheless, although Blumenberg's view acknowledges that the modern invocation of some global idea of human progress is inextricably part of the Western Enlightenment, which means that it has been shaped by the universal claims of the Judeo-Christian tradition as well as by an invidious imperial quest for universal hegemony, it also usefully undermines the claim that the formal similarity of such progress to Judeo-Christian notions of redemption and salvation means nothing more than an incoherent reproduction of the content of Judeo-Christian teaching, as Löwith would claim, insofar as any *future* progress is understood as an open-ended and contingent process. From this point of view, the great evils of empire appear to be less a function of some Lyotardian *grand récit* justifying a colonizing belief in progress itself—though this is the sort of claim that a postmodern, academic anti-imperialism has made with great success—than of a self-declared prerogative (defended usually at the point of a gun) to decide unilaterally what would count as progress, especially in the realms of political organization. After all, it is only in the context of a belief that an at least marginally better state of things, both locally and globally speaking, can be had that one would rationally resist such unilateral determinations of the meaning of progress in the first place. What this implies, I think, is that no viable secular modernity, that is, one based solely on those bare Hobbesian imperatives of self-preservation and deliberation, can do without both a notion of progress and a refusal of redemption.

If Löwith and MacIntyre are correct, there is no reason to assume that anything like global human rights, much less universal standards of justice,

could be pursued in modernity on grounds other than those of a contradictory political theology, or Luhmannian systems theory, that posits social self-deception as the only true basis of functioning norms. In what could be taken anachronistically as the logical consequence of Luhmann's work, Strauss's political philosophy actually allows for the legitimate production of this social deception on the part of enlightened rulers, who keep the more disturbing truth about truth—the open-ended, even subversive nature of the search for knowledge, as opposed to the illusory but necessary moral opinions of political society—to themselves (see Strauss, *Natural* 141–42; *Political* 229). But if Blumenberg is correct, one must still reckon with the question whether a "legitimate" idea of progressive, secular modernity must continue to draw ethical "sustenance," as Habermas puts it, uniquely from its Judeo-Christian heritage, or can sustain itself by reference to other religious traditions or without reference to any religious traditions at all. (For example, is a putatively godless French Republicanism, putatively based on nothing but its secular Enlightenment perspective, as independent of all religious underwriting as it generally presumes itself to be? Asad would say no, and I would say he was right.)

Moreover, one must then also address the real difficulty that any Habermasian invocation of a single ethical-political legacy with "no alternatives" poses for truly global, cosmopolitan, and pluralistic or overlapping notions of justice. Recovering the precarious deist faith of Diderot may indeed seem impossible, but there may yet be good reasons not to abandon completely, not to forsake reoccupying, the thin but broad consensual universalism embedded in Diderot's vision. It is the larger question that remains the most salient: Can that vision itself be made sufficiently self-conscious of and hence relatively autonomous from its simultaneously Judeo-Christian and imperialist foundations, and articulated with similar tendencies in other ethical-religious traditions, to be serviceable in a global age? It should come as no surprise if many, both within and outside the West, remain more than a little skeptical.

"Whatever and however we may try to think, we think within the sphere of tradition," Heidegger wrote at the end of his late essay "The Principle of Identity." "Tradition prevails when it frees us from thinking back to a thinking forward, which is no longer a planning. Only when we turn thoughtfully toward what has already been thought, will we be turned to use for what must still be thought" (Heidegger, *Identity* 41). What I would like to imagine, then, is a version of secular cultural criticism newly engaged by the tensions and inconsistencies in the secularization story, both as that story has unfolded—and continues to unfold—in the West, and as it occurs in different guises and with clearly different results outside the West. But in either case, what is important (as Asad and others before him noted) is that the static and totalizing concept of secularism—connoting an already achieved and reliably reproducible intellectual standpoint—be supplanted with a dynamic understanding of secularization, that is, with a process that has remained, at least up to the present, in some ambiguous relationship with religious tradition, neither translation and transformation, nor radical overturning and forgetting.

Bibliography

Abrams, M. H. *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature.* New York: W. W. Norton, 1971.

Acéphale: Religion, sociologie, philosophie, 1936–39. Paris: Editions Jean-Michel Place, 1980.

Adorno, Theodor. *Aesthetic Theory.* Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

_____. *The Jargon of Authenticity.* Trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

_____. *Notes to Literature.* Vol. 2. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

_____. *Prisms.* Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984.

Adorno, Theodor, and Walter Benjamin. *The Complete Correspondence, 1928–1940.* Ed. Henri Lonitz. Trans. Nicholas Walker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Ali, Tariq. *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity.* London: Verso, 2002.

Almond, Gabriel A., R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, eds. *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Anderson, Amanda. *The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* Rev. ed. London: Verso, 1991.

Annan, Noel. "The Intellectual Aristocracy." *Studies in Social History.* Ed. J. H. Plumb. London: Longmans, Green, 1955, 241–87.

_____. *Leslie Stephen: The Godless Victorian.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984.

apRoberts, Ruth. "Frederic E. Faverty's *Matthew Arnold, the Ethnologist*." *The Arnoldian* 15, no. 1 (1987–88): 95–98.
Aquinas, Thomas. *An Aquinas Reader: Selections from the Writings of Thomas Aquinas*. Ed. Mary T. Clark. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988.
Aristotle. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Rev. Oxford translation. 2 vols. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Arnold, Matthew. *Complete Prose Works*. 11 vols. Ed. R. H. Super. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960–77.
Aron, Raymond. *L'opium des intellectuels*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1955.
Asad, Talal. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
_____. *Genealogies of Religion*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
Auerbach, Erich. *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*. Fiftieth anniversary ed. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Intro. Edward W. Said. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Baader, Franz von. *Sämmtliche Werke*. 16 vols. Ed. Franz Hoffman, Julius Hamberger, Anton Lutterbeck, F. von Osten, and Christoph Schlüter. Leipzig: Herrmann Bethmann, 1851–60.
Bacon, Francis. *The Great Instauration; and, New Atlantis*. Ed. J. Weinberger. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1980.
Barker, Eileen, James A. Beckford, and Karel Dobbelaere, eds. *Secularization, Rationalism, and Sectarianism: Essays in Honour of Bryan R. Wilson*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Bataille, Georges. *Théorie de la religion*. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1973.
_____. *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927–1939*. Ed. Allan Stoekl. Trans. Allan Stoekl, with Carl R. Lovitt and Donald M. Leslie Jr. Theory and History of Literature 14. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.
Bataille, Georges, and Michel Leiris, Marcel Griaule, Carl Einstein, Robert Desnos, et al. *Encyclopaedia Acephalica*. Ed. Alastair Brotchie. Trans. Iain White et al. London: Atlas Press, 1995.
Beer, Gillian. *Arguing with the Past: Essays in Narrative from Woolf to Sidney*. London: Routledge, 1989.
Bell, Clive. *Art*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1914.
Bell, David A. *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Bell, Quentin. *Bloomsbury*. London: Omega, 1974.
Bellah, Robert. *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Benda, Julien. *La trahison des clercs*. Paris: B. Grasset, 1927.
Benhabib, Seyla. *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Benjamin, Walter. *The Arcades Project*. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.
_____. *Correspondence of Walter Benjamin*. Ed. Gerschom Scholem and Theodor Adorno. Trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

_____. *Gesammelte Briefe*. 4 vols. Ed. Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995.
_____. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972–89.
_____. *Origins of German Tragic Drama*. Trans. John Osborne. London: Verso, 1985.
_____. *Schriften*. 2 vols. Ed. Theodor Adorno and Gretel Adorno. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1955.
_____. *Selected Writings*. Vol. 1: 1913–26. Ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings. Trans. Edmund Jephcott et al. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996.
_____. *Selected Writings*. Vol. 2: 1927–34. Ed. Michael Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gray Smith. Trans. Edmund Jephcott et al. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.
_____. *Selected Writings*. Vol. 3: 1935–38. Ed. Michael W. Jennings, Marcus Bullock, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith. Trans. Edmund Jephcott et al. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.
_____. *Selected Writings*. Vol. 4: 1938–40. Ed. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings. Trans. Edmund Jephcott et al. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003.
Berger, Peter L. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967.
_____, ed. *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. New York: William B. Erdmans, 1999.
Berlin, Isaiah. *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*. Ed. Henry Hardy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
_____. *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*. London: John Murray, 1990.
_____. *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History*. London: Grove, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953.
Berman, Jessica. *Modernist Fiction, Cosmopolitanism, and the Politics of Community*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Bersani, Leo. *The Culture of Redemption*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Bhabha, Homi. "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse." *October: The First Decade, 1976–1986*. Ed. Annette Michelson et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987, 317–26.
Biale, David. *Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
Bloch, Ernst. *Spirit of Utopia*. Trans. Anthony Nassar. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Blumenberg, Hans. *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. Trans. Robert M. Wallace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.
_____. "On a Lineage of the Idea of Progress." *Social Research* 41 (1974): 5–27.
Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Brennan, Timothy. *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Brooks, Cleanth. *Community, Religion, and Literature.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995.

Brown, Callum G. "A Revisionist Approach to Religious Change." *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis.* Ed. Steve Bruce. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 31–58.

Bruce, Steve, ed. *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis.* Ed. Steve Bruce. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Burckhardt, Jacob. *The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy.* Trans. S. G. C. Middlemore. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1904.

Burke, Peter. *The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy.* Rev. ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Burnouf, Emile. *The Science of Religions.* Trans. Julie Liebe. London: S. Sonnenschein, Lowrey, 1888.

Bury, J. B. *The Idea of Progress.* New York: 1932.

Bush, Ronald. "The Presence of the Past: Ethnographic Thinking/Literary Politics." *Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism.* Ed. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995, 23–41.

Buzard, James. "Notes on the Defenestration of Culture." *Disciplinarity at the Fin de Siècle.* Ed. Amanda Anderson and Joseph Valente. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, 312–31.

Calvin, John. *Institutes of the Christian Religion.* 2 vols. Trans. John Allen. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1935.

Casanova, Pascal. *The World Republic of Letters.* Trans. M. B. DeBevoise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Cassirer, Ernst. *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment.* Trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Chadwick, Owen. *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonal Thought and Historical Difference.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Chapman, Malcolm. *The Celts: The Construction of a Myth.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

_____. *The Gaelic Vision in Scottish Culture.* London: Croom Helm, 1978.

Cohen, H. Floris. *The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Colley, Linda. *Britons.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.

Connell, Matt. "Through the Eyes of the Artificial Angel: Secular Theology in Theodor Adorno's Freudo-Marxist Reading of Franz Kafka and Walter Benjamin." *Trajectories of Mysticism in Theory and Literature.* Ed. Philip Leonard. London: Macmillan, 2000, 198–218.

Conrad, Joseph. *Heart of Darkness.* Ed. Robert Kimbrough. New York: Norton, 1988.

_____. *Lord Jim.* Ed. Thomas Moser. New York: Norton, 1968.

Cornford, F. M. *From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Coulson, John. *Religion and Imagination: "In Aid of a Grammar of Assent."* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Crapanzano, Vincent. "The Moment of Prestidigitation: Magic, Illusion, and Mana in the Thought of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss." *Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism.* Ed. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995, 95–113.

Crusius, Irene, ed. *Zur Säkularisation geistlicher Institutionen im 16. und im 18./19. Jahrhundert.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996.

Davie, Grace. *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

DeKoven, Marianne. *Rich and Strange: Gender, History, Modernism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

DeLaura, David J. *Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969.

Derrida, Jacques. *Acts of Religion.* Ed. Gil Anidjar. New York: Routledge, 2002.

_____. *Of Grammatology.* Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

_____. *Margins of Philosophy.* Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

_____. *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International.* Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1994.

DeSalvo, Louise A. *Virginia Woolf's First Voyage: A Novel in the Making.* Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980.

Diderot, Denis. *Oeuvres.* 5 vols. Ed. Laurent Versini. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1994.

Dieckhoff, Reiner. *Mythos und Moderne: Uber die verborgene Mystik in den Schriften Walter Benjamins.* Cologne: Janus Presse, 1987.

Dobbelaere, Karel. "Secularization: A Multi-Dimensional Concept." *Current Sociology* 29, no. 2 (1981): 1–216.

Duara, Prasenjit. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Du Bois, W. E. B. *The Souls of Black Folk.* New York: Penguin, 1989.

Durkheim, Emile. *The Division of Labor in Society.* Trans. W. D. Halls. New York: Free Press, 1984.

_____. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.* Trans. Karen E. Fields. New York: Free Press, 1995.

_____. *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: Le système totémique en Australie.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.

_____. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals.* London: Routledge, 1957.

_____. *Rules of Sociological Method.* Ed. Steven Lukes. Trans. W. D. Halls. New York: Free Press, 1982.

_____. *Le suicide: Etude de sociologie.* Paris: Quadrige-PUF, 1930.

Durkheim, Emile, and Marcel Mauss. "De quelques formes primitives de classification." *L'année sociologique* 6 (1901–2): 1–72.

Edwards, W. F. *Recherches sur les langues celtiques.* Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1844.

Eliade, Mircea. *The Sacred and the Profane.* Trans. Willard R. Trask. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.

Eliot, T. S. *After Strange Gods.* London: Faber & Faber, 1934.
_____. "Durkheim." Review of Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. J. W. Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915). Reprinted in Louis Menand and Sanford Schwartz. "T. S. Eliot on Durkheim." *Modern Philology* 79, no. 3 (February 1982): 309–15.
_____. *Notes towards the Definition of Culture.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949.
_____. "Review of Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* trans. J. W. Swain." *Monist* 28, no. 1 (January 1918): 158–59.
_____. *Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot.* Ed. Frank Kermode. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.
Ellmann, Richard. *James Joyce.* Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
———, ed. *Edwardians and Late Victorians.* English Institute Essays, 1959. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.
Fabian, Johannes. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
Fagan, Henry Stuart. "Notices of Books." *Contemporary Review* 6 (1867): 257–61.
Falck, Colin. *Myth, Truth and Literature: Towards a True Post-Modernism.* 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Faverty, Frederic. *Matthew Arnold, the Ethnologist.* Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1951.
Ferry, Luc. *L'Homme-Dieu, ou le sens de la vie.* Paris: Grasset, 1996.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Addresses to the German Nation.* Trans. R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979.
Fish, Stanley. *The Trouble with Principle.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Fletcher, Richard. *The Cross and the Crescent: Christianity and Islam from Muhammad to the Reformation.* New York: Viking Books, 2004.
Foucault, Michel. *Histoire de la folie.* Paris: Librairie Plon, 1961.
_____. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice.* Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977, 139–64.
Freeden, Michael. *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
Frye, Northrop. *Anatomy of Criticism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.
Gallagher, Catherine. "George Eliot and Daniel Deronda: The Prostitute and the Jewish Question." *Sex, Politics, and Science in the Nineteenth-Century Novel.* Ed. Ruth Bernard Yeazell. Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1983–84, new series, no. 10. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 39–62.
Gauchet, Marcel. *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion.* Trans. Oscar Burge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures.* New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Gehlen, Arnold. "Die Säkularisierung des Forstschrifts." *Einblicke.* Vol. 7. Ed. K. S. Rehberg. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978.
Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Giddens, Anthony. *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Gilman, Sander. "Ethnicity-Ethnicities-Literature-Literatures." *PMLA* 113 (1998): 19–27.
Gordon, David J. *Literary Atheism.* New York: Peter Lang, 2002.
Gossman, Lionel. "Philhellenism and Antisemitism: Mathew Arnold and his German Models." *Comparative Literature* 46 (1994): 1–39.
Gottfried, Leon. *Matthew Arnold and the Romantics.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.
Graff, Gerald. "Arnold, Reason, and Common Culture." Mathew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy.* Ed. Samuel Lipman. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994, 186–201.
Gunn, Giles. *The Culture of Criticism and the Criticism of Culture.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
_____. *The Interpretation of Otherness: Literature, Religion, and the American Imagination.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
_____. "On Edward W. Said." *Raritan* 23, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 71–78.
———, ed. *Literature and Religion.* New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe." *Praxis International* 12, no. 1 (April 1992): 1–19.
_____. *Legitimation Crisis.* Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.
_____. *Nachmetaphysiches Denken.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988. Cited in "Transcendence." Trans. Eric Crump and Peter P. Kenny. *Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity.* Ed. Eduardo Mendieta. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002, 79.
_____. *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.* Trans. Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
_____. *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays.* Trans. Max Pensky. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
_____. *Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity.* Ed. Eduardo Mendieta. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.
_____. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society.* Trans. Thomas Burger, with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.
_____. *Theory and Practice.* Trans. John Viertel. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
_____. "Walter Benjamin: Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique." *Philosophical-Political Profiles.* Trans. Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983, 129–63.
Handelman, Susan A. *Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, Scholem, and Levinas.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
Hanson, Ellis. *Decadence and Catholicism.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Harrington, Austin. "Ernst Troeltsch's Concept of Europe." *European Journal of Social Theory* 7, no. 4 (2004): 479–98.
Harrison, Jane. *Unanimism: A Study of Conversion and Some Contemporary French Poets. Being A Paper Read before "The Heretics" on November 25, 1912.* Cambridge: Express\ Printing, 1913.
Harrison, Thomas. *1910: The Emancipation of Dissonance.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Hartman, Geoffrey. *Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study of Literature Today.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980.

Hauriou, Maurice. "The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism." *The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, and Joseph T. Delos.* Ed. Albert Broderick. Trans. Mary Welling. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Hazlitt, William. *The Collected Works of William Hazlitt.* 12 vols. Ed. A. R. Waller and Arnold Glover. London: J. M. Dent, 1902–4.

Hegel, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

_____. *The Philosophy of History.* Trans. J. Sibree. New York: Dover, 1956.

Heidegger, Martin. *Identity and Difference.* Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

_____. *Poetry, Language, Thought.* Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper Colophon, 1971.

Heine, Heinrich. "Ludwig Börne: Eine Denkschrift." 1841. *Werke und Briefe.* Ed. Kans Kaufmann. 10 vols. Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1962, 6:83–229.

Herbert, Christopher. *Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Herf, Jeffrey. *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Hill, Christopher. *Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in the Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century.* New York: Schocken, 1964.

Hohendahl, Peter Uwe, ed. *Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and National Culture: Public Culture in Hamburg, 1700–1933.* Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003.

Hollier, Denis. *Le Collège de sociologie.* Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1979.

Horkheimer, Max, and Adorno, Theodor W. *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.

_____. *Dialektik der Aufklärung.* New York: Social Studies Association, 1944.

Howse, Ernest Marshall. *Saints in Politics: The Clapham Sect and the Growth of Freedom.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952.

Hughes, Stuart H. *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930.* New York: Vintage Books, 1958.

Huizinga, Johan. *The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries.* Trans. F. Hopman. London: E. Arnold, 1937.

Hume, David. *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.* Ed. Stanley Tweyman. London: Routledge, 1991.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Israel, Jonathan I. *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Jacob, Margaret. *Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

James, William. *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature.* New York: Mentor/New American Library, 1958.

Jameson, Fredric. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981.

Joyce, James. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.* Ed. Chester Anderson. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.

_____. *Ulysses.* Ed. Hans Walter Gabler. New York: Vintage, 1986.

Kafka, Franz. "The Truth about Sancho Panza." *The Complete Stories.* Ed. Nahum Glatzer. New York: Schocken Books, 1976.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason.* Trans. F. Max Müller. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966.

Keddie, Nikki. "Secularism and the State: Towards Clarity and Global Comparison." *New Left Review* 226 (October–November 1997): 21–40.

Kelleher, John V. "Matthew Arnold and the Celtic Revival." *Perspectives of Criticism.* Ed. Harry Levin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950, 197–221.

Ker, Ian Turnbull. *Catholic Revival in English Literature, 1845–1961: Newman, Hopkins, Belloc, Chesterton, Greene, Waugh.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.

Kierkegaard, Sören. *Either/Or.* 2 vols. Ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.

_____. *Fear and Trembling, Repetition.* Ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Kosmin, Barry, and Seymour P. Lachman. *One Nation under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society.* New York: Harmony Books, 1993.

Kracauer, Siegfried. *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological Study of the German Film.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947.

_____. *History: The Last Things before the Last.* Completed and ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____. *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays.* Trans. and ed. Thomas Y. Levin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

_____. *Orpheus in Paris: Offenbach and the Paris of His Time.* Trans. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher. New York: Vienna House, 1972.

_____. *The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany.* Trans. Quintin Hoare. London: Verso, 1998.

LaCapra, Dominick. *Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972.

_____. *History, Politics, and the Novel.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Lang, Andrew. "The Celtic Renascence." *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 161 (1897): 181–92.

Laslett, Peter. *The World We Have Lost.* London: Methuen, 1971.

Lee, Hermione. *The Novels of Virginia Woolf.* London: Methuen, 1977.

_____. *Virginia Woolf.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.

Lehmann, Hartmut. *Protestantisches Christentum im Prozess der Säkularisierung.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001.

Lenzer, Gertrude, ed. *Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings.* New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

Leonard, Philip, ed. *Trajectories of Mysticism in Theory and Literature.* London: Macmillan, 2000.

Lepenies, Wolf. *Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology.* Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss.* Trans. Felicity Baker. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
_____. *The Raw and the Cooked.* Trans. John and Doreen Weightman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
_____. *Structural Anthropology.* Vol. 2. Trans. Monique Layton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
_____. *Totemism.* Trans. Rodney Needham. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.
Levy, Paul. *Moore: G. E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Lewis, Bernard. *What Went Wrong?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
_____. *Islam and the West.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Lilla, Mark. "The Lure of Syracuse." *New York Review of Books* 48, no. 14 (September 20, 2001): 81–86.
_____. *The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics.* New York: New York Review Books, 2001.
Lincoln, Bruce. *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Lloyd, David. "Arnold, Ferguson, Schiller." *Cultural Critique* 1 (1985): 137–69.
Loos, Adolf. *Ornament and Crime: Selected Essays.* Ed. Adolf Opel. Trans. Michael Mitchell. Riverside, CA: Ariadne Press, 1998.
Lotze, Hermann. *Mikrocosmus: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit; Versuch einer Anthropologie.* 3 vols. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1876–80.
Löwith, Karl. *Meaning in History.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.
Löwy, Michael. "Jewish Messianism and Libertarian Utopia in Central Europe." Trans. Renée B. Larrier. *New German Critique* 20 (Spring–Summer 1980): 105–15.
Lübbe, H. *Säkularisierung: Geschichte einen ideenpolitischen Begriffs.* Freiburg: Alber, 1965.
Luhmann, Niklas. "Positives Recht und Ideologie." *Soziologische Aufklärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme.* Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970, 178–203.
_____. "Soziologie des politischen Systems." *Soziologische Aufklärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme.* Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970, 154–77.
Lukács, Georg. *The Destruction of Reason.* Trans. Peter Palmer. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981.
_____. "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat." *History and Class Consciousness.* Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968.
Lukes, Steven. *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work.* New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Lyotard, Francois. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.* Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Theory and History of Literature 10. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. *After Virtue.* 2nd ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
Macpherson, James. *Poems of Ossian.* 3 vols. Trans. James Macpherson. London: W. Miller, J. Murray, & J. Harding, 1805.
McCole, John. *Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.

McLeod, Hugh. *Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848–1914.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
McMahon, Darrin M. *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Mailloux, Steven. "Contingent Universals: Religious Fundamentalism, Academic Postmodernism, and Public Intellectuals in the Aftermath of September 11." *Cardozo Law Review* 24, no. 4 (2003): 1583–1604.
Maistre, Joseph de. *Etude sur la souveraineté.* In *Oeuvres complètes, I–II.* Geneva: Slatkin Reprints, 1979, 1:311–554.
Manent, Pierre. *The City of Man.* Trans. Marc A. LePain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Manganaro, Marc. "'Beating a Drum in a Jungle': T. S. Eliot on the Artist as 'Primitive.'" *Modern Language Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (December 1986): 393–421.
Martí, José. *The America of José Martí: Selected Writings of José Martí.* Trans. Juan de Os. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954.
Martin, David. *A General Theory of Secularization.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.
Martin, Henri. *Histoire de France, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'en 1789.* 17 vols. Paris: Furne, 1855–60.
Martz, Louis L. *Many Gods and Many Voices: The Role of the Prophet in English and American Modernism.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998.
Marx, Karl. "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right.'" *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.* Trans. Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley. Ed. Joseph O'Malley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
_____. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.* Trans. anon. New York: International, 1981.
_____. "On the Jewish Question." *Selected Writings.* Ed. Lawrence Simon. Trans. Lloyd Easton and Kurt Guddat. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994, 1–26.
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology, Part 1.* Ed. C. J. Arthur. Trans. W. Lough. New York: International, 1977.
Menand, Louis, and Sanford Schwartz. "T. S. Eliot on Durkheim." *Modern Philology* 79, no. 3 (February 1982): 309–15.
Michaels, Walter Benn. *Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.
Milbank, John. *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
_____. *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
Mill, John Stuart. "On Liberty." *The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill.* New York: Modern Library, 2002, 3–119.
_____. *Principles of Political Economy, with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy.* London: Longmans, Green, 1909.
Miller, J. Hillis. *Poets of Reality.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
Molitor, Franz Joseph. *Philosophie der Geschichte, oder Über die Tradition in dem alten Bunde und ihre Beziehung zur Kirche des neuen Bundes (mit vorzüglicher Rücksicht auf die Kabbalah).* 3 vols. in 2. Münster: Theissingschen Buchhandlung, 1834–39.
Monod, Jean-Claude. *La querelle de la sécularization de Hegel à Blumenberg.* Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2002.

Nairn, Tom. *The Break-Up of Britain*. London: New Left Books, 1977.
Nandy, Ashis. "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance." *Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots, and Survivors in South Asia*. Ed. Veena Das. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990, 69–91.
_____. *The Romance of the State and the Fate of Dissent in the Tropics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilization in China*. 7 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954.
Nielsen, Donald A. *Three Faces of God: Society, Religion, and the Categories of Totality in the Philosophy of Emile Durkheim*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
_____. *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.
_____. *The Use and Abuse of History*. Trans. Adrian Collins. Indianapolis, IN: Bobs-Merrill, 1957.
Nisbet, Robert A. "The French Revolution and the Rise of Sociology." 1943. *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Ed. Peter Hamilton. 4 vols. London: Routledge, 1990, 1:38–48.
Nussbaum, Martha. *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Orr, John, Archdeacon of Ferns. *The Theory of Religion, in its Absolute Internal State: In Three Parts. I. Of the Nature and End of Religion, its Rise and Progress in the Human Mind, and the Improvement and Reinforcement which it receives from the Revelation of the Gospel. II. Of the Evidences of Nature and Revealed Religion in general; with a Review of some of the most material Objections, which have been urged against them. III. Of the Excellence and Importance of True Religion, With A Conclusion, in relation to the Persons, who disbelieve, or doubt of the Truth of Religion, and likewise to those who profess to be Believers of it*. London: A. Millar, 1762.
Parsons, Talcott. *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.
Passerin D'Entrèves, Maurizio, and Seyla Benhabib, eds. *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
Pecora, Vincent P. *Households of the Soul*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.
_____, ed. *Nations and Identities: Classic Readings*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001.
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. "Among Wealthy Nations . . . U.S. Stands Alone in its Embrace of Religion." *Pew Global Attitudes Project*. Survey report released December 19, 2002. Available online at http://www.people-press.org/reports.
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. "Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus." Survey report released July 24, 2003. Available online at http://www.people-press.org/reports.
Pickering, W. S. F. *Durkheim's Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.
Pitt, R. "Exploration of Self in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* and Woolf's *Voyage Out*." *Conradiana* 10, no. 2 (1978): 141–54.

Popper, Karl. *The Poverty of Historicism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957.
Porter, Roy, and Simon Schama. *Flesh in the Age of Reason: The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004.
Prince, Morton. *The Dissociation of a Personality: A Biographical Study in Abnormal Psychology*. London: Longmans, Green, 1905.
Prüfer, Sebastian. *Sozialismus statt Religion: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vor der religiösen Frage, 1863–1890*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002.
Putnam, Hilary. "Wittgenstein on Religious Belief." *On Community*. Ed. Leroy S. Rounder. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1991, 56–75.
Rabinbach, Anson. "Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, Bloch and Modern German Jewish Messianism." *New German Critique* 34 (Winter 1985): 78–124.
Ranulf, Svend. "Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism." 1939. *Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments*. Ed. Peter Hamilton. 4 vols. London: Routledge, 1990, 1:23–37.
Rawls, John. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Renan, Ernest. *Essais de morale et de critique*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1924.
_____. *Histoire du peuple d'Israël*. 5 vols. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1889–93.
_____. *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* Paris: Pierre Bordas et fils, 1991.
Richman, Michèle H. *Sacred Revolutions: Durkheim and the Collège de Sociologie*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
Riesterer, Berthold P. *Karl Löwith's View of History: A Critical Appraisal of Historicism*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
Robbins, Bruce. *Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
Rorty, Richard. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Rose, Jonathan. *The Edwardian Temperament, 1895–1919*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986.
Rosenberg, Alfred. *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*. Trans. Vivian Bird. Newport Beach, CA: Noontide Press, 1982.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Government of Poland*. Trans. Willmoore Kendall. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972.
Rudolf, R. de M., I.S.O. "The Clapham Sect." *Clapham and the Clapham Sect*. Clapham, London: Clapham Antiquarian Society & Edmund Baldwin, 1927, 89–142.
Said, Edward W. *Beginnings: Intention and Method*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
_____. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
_____. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
_____. *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
_____. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Sanson, Henri. *Laïcité islamique en Algerie*. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1983.
Sayre, Robert, and Michael Löwy. "Figures of Romantic Anti-Capitalism." *New German Critique* 32 (Spring–Summer 1984): 42–92.

Schiller, Friedrich. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters.* Trans. Reginald Snell. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983.
Schmitt, Carl. *Political Romanticism.* Trans. Guy Oakes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
_____. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.* Trans. George Schwab. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.
_____. *Roman Catholicism and Political Form.* Trans. G. L. Ulmen. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.
_____. *Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der Politischen Einheit.* Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935.
_____. *Uber die drei Arten des Rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens.* Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934.
Scholem, Gershom G. *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism.* Rev. ed. New York: Schocken Books, 1941.
_____. *On Jews and Judaism in Crisis: Selected Essays.* Ed. Werner J. Dannhauser. New York: Schocken Books, 1976.
_____. *Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship.* Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1981.
Schrempp, Gregory. "Aristotle's Other Self: On the Boundless Subject of Anthropological Discourse." *Romantic Motives: Essays on Anthropological Sensibility.* Ed. George W. Stocking Jr. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
Scott, Nathan A., Jr. *Negative Capability: Studies in the New Literature and the Religious Situation.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969.
Senancour, Etienne Pivert de. *Obermann.* Paris: Libraire E. Droz, 1931.
Shapin, Steven. *The Scientific Revolution.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Silverstein, Brian. "Islam and Modernity in Turkey: Power, Tradition and Historicity in the European Provinces of the Muslim World." *Anthropological Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2003): 497–517.
Simmel, Georg. *The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays.* Trans. K. Peter Etzkorn. New York: Teacher's College Press, Columbia University, 1968.
_____. *The Philosophy of Money.* Trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
Sironneau, Jean-Pierre. *Sécularisation et religions politiques.* La Haye: Mouton, 1982.
Smart, J. S. *James Macpherson: An Episode in Literature.* London: David Nutt, 1905.
Smith, Adam. *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments.* Ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity.* London: Penguin, 1991.
_____. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism.* London: Routledge, 1998.
Stark, Rodney. *For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Stephen, Sir James. *Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography.* London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer, 1868.
Stephen, Leslie. *Selected Writings in British Intellectual History.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

Stocking, George. "Matthew Arnold, E. B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention." *American Anthropologist* 65 (1963): 783–99.
Stockton, Kathryn Bond. *God between Their Lips: Desire between Women in Irigaray, Brontë, and Eliot.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Strauss, Leo. *Natural Right and History.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
_____. *What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies.* Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959.
Tan, Kok-chor. *Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Taylor, Charles. *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Taylor, Mark C. *Tears.* New York: State University of New York Press, 1990.
Tennyson, G. B., and Edward E. Ericson Jr., eds. *Religion and Modern Literature: Essays in Theory and Criticism.* Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1975.
Thierry, Amédée. *Histoire des gaulois, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à l'entière soumission de la Gaule à la domination romaine.* 2 vols. Paris: Hachette, 1835.
Tiedemann, Rolf. "Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the *Passagen-Werk.*" Walter Benjamin. *The Arcades Project.* Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, 929–45.
_____. "Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the Theses 'On the Concept of History.'" *Philosophical Forum* 4, no. 1–2 (1983–84): 71–104.
Traverso, Enzo. *The Marxists and the Jewish Question: The History of a Debate, 1843–1943.* Trans. Bernard Gibbons. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1994.
Trilling, Lionel. *Matthew Arnold.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
van der Veer, Peter, and Hartmut Lehmann, eds. *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Vattimo, Gianni. *The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-Modern Culture.* Trans. Jon R. Snyder. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.
Viswanathan, Gauri. *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
_____. *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Waché, Brigitte. *Religion et culture en Europe occidentale au XIXe siècle.* Paris: Belin, 2002.
Wallace, Robert M. "Progress, Secularization and Modernity: The Löwith-Blumenberg Debate." *New German Critique* 22 (1981): 63–79.
Wallis, Roy, and Steve Bruce. "Secularization: The Orthodox Model." *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis.* Ed. Steve Bruce. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 8–30.
Ward, Graham. *Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
_____. *True Religion.* Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003.
Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.* 2 vols. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
_____. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Trans. Talcott Parsons. London: Routledge, 2001.

_____. *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism.* Trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958.
White, Hayden. *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
Wilder, Amos N. *Theology and Modern Literature.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958.
Williams, Raymond. *Culture and Society, 1780–1950.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
Witte, Bernd. "Paris–Berlin–Paris: Personal, Literary, and Social Experience in Walter Benjamin's Late Works." Trans. Susan B. Winnett. *New German Critique* 39 (Autumn 1986): 49–60.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief.* Ed. Cyril Barrett. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
Wolin, Richard. *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption.* Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Wolosky, Shira. *The Negative Way of Language in Eliot, Beckett, and Celan.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Woolf, Virginia. *Between the Acts.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969.
_____. *The Diary of Virginia Woolf.* 5 vols. Ed. Anne Olivier Bell. London: Hogarth Press, 1977.
_____. *Melymbrosia.* Ed. Louise A. DeSalvo. New York: New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox & Tilden Foundations, 1982.
_____. *Moments of Being.* Ed. Jeanne Schulkind. San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1985.
_____. "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown." 1924. *Collected Essays.* London: Hogarth Press, 1966, 1:319–37.
_____. *Mrs. Dalloway.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1953.
_____. *Night and Day.* San Diego: Harcourt, 1948.
_____. *Three Guineas.* San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1966.
_____. *To the Lighthouse.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955.
_____. *The Voyage Out.* New York: Modern Library, 2001.
_____. *The Waves.* New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1959.
Yates, Frances. *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Yeats, William Butler. "The Celtic Element in Literature." *Ideas of Good and Evil.* London: A. H. Bullen, 1903, 270–95.
Young, Robert J. C. *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race.* London: Routledge, 1995.